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The Arab Spring protests in 2011 uprooted regimes, challenged authoritarian leaders, and 
provided protesters new tools for mobilization. The use of social media and the 
involvement of women in public protests indicated changing protest repertoires and 
movement demographics in many countries. When women protested in 2011, they 
mobilized both physically and virtually. Assessing the influence women exert in social 
movements through social media can provide insights into factors that make a social 
movement successful.  
This thesis ascertains that women physically mobilized to participate in the Arab 
Spring protests in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain. In Egypt and Bahrain, women also 
mobilized virtually using social media, while in Yemen women participated through 
traditional forms of social mobilization. An assessment of Twitter data in Egypt and 
Bahrain indicates that women communicated out to others more than their male 
counterparts, while men received more information from others. Data also indicates that 
women followed significantly more sources of information than men, thus contributing to 
the diversity of online protest networks. Notably, women represented nearly fifty percent 
of the most connected users in the Egyptian Twitter data, communicating to nearly twice 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. RESEARCH PROBLEM AND SIGNIFICANCE 
In 2011, the Arab Spring protests swept through the Middle East demanding 
democracy, challenging authoritarian regimes, and ousting leaders. Recent studies cite 
longstanding social, economic, and political challenges as the roots of the Arab Spring.1 
As the protests evolved, the use of social media and the involvement of women in public 
protests garnered public attention and indicated changing protest repertoires and 
demographics in the Middle East. When women took to the streets in 2011, they also 
logged onto the Internet, brought their mobile phones, Tweeted, blogged, and 
demonstrated support through Facebook campaigns. In Egypt, for example, social media 
empowered women to both engage in online activism and participate in the protests, at 
the height of the protests in Tahrir Square it is estimated that almost 25 percent of the 
million protestors were women.2 As women engage in the public sphere of social media, 
how will they affect social movements? 
The inclusion of women in social movements can increase the potential for 
diversity within movements, an important factor in mobilization. Literature reviews of 
social movements and social media networks stress the importance of diversity in the 
success of collective action. In cases where the sociocultural barriers of Middle Eastern 
culture may prevent women from participating publicly in social movements, the 
incorporation of social media and Web 2.0 technology into the recent protests movements 
                                                 
1 Sean Aday, Henry Farrell, Marc Lynch, John Sides, and Deen Freelon, “Blogs and Bullets II: New 
Media and Conflict After the Arab Spring,” Peaceworks, US Institute of Peace, 80 (2012), 3–5, retrieved 
November 15, 2012, from http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PW80.pdf; Taylor Dewey, Juleian Kaden, 
Miriam Marks, Shun Matsushima, and Beijing Zhu, “The Impact of Social Media on Social Unrest In the 
Arab Spring,” Stanford University(2012) 50, retrieved October 15, 2012, from 
http://publicpolicy.stanford.edu/.../SocialMedia_FINAL%2020%20Mar.pdf. 
2 Sahar Khamis and Katherine Vaughn, “Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution: How Civic 
Engagement and Citizen Journalism Tilted the Balance,” Arab Media and Society (summer 2011): 13, 
retrieved May 1, 2013, from http://www.arabmediasociety.com/countries/index.php?c_article=249. 
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opened doors for female participation.3 Women like Asmaa Mahfouz in Egypt, Zeinab 
al—Khawaja in Bahrain, and Shatha al—Hazari in Yemen utilized social media and the 
Internet to express ideas, coordinate action, and challenge the status quo.4 While writers 
assert that women made a difference through their virtual activism or actual mobilization, 
it is harder to quantify how successful these women have been in shaping social 
movements through their use of social media tools. How do women influence social 
movements through their use of social media? Furthermore, do women use social media 
differently while participating in social movements, and to what extent does female 
participation via social media influence the success of a social movement, particularly in 
gender segregated environments? This thesis tests the hypothesis that women in the 
Middle East have a differential impact on social movements through their online activism 
and employment of social media. 
1. Women, Information Technology, and Social Media in the Middle 
East 
As the Arab Spring protests took place in the Middle East, women, a group 
largely perceived as marginalized in Middle Eastern cultures and societies, firmly 
established a presence in online social media sites and virtual social movement networks 
that were traditionally considered public and masculine spaces.5 The presence of women 
online is not only unlikely to recede, but will become more prominent with the increase 
in women’s literacy and education, computer training initiatives, and the growing view of 
Internet technologies as a source both information and empowerment. While women may  
 
                                                 
3 “Arab Social Media Report: The Role of Social Media in Arab Women’s Empowerment,” Arab 
Social Media Report 1, no. 3 (2011), retrieved November, 1 2012, from 
http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com/UserManagement/PDF/ASMR%20Report%203.pdf; Courtney 
Radsch, “Arab Media: Unveiling the Revolutionaries: Cyber Activism and the Role of Women in the Arab 
Uprisings,” (2012), 5–7, retrieved October 1, 2012, from http://www.radsch.info/2012/05/unveiling-
revolutionaries-cyberactivism.html. 
4 Radsch, “Unveiling the Revolutionaries,” 5–7. 
5 Victoria A Newsom and Lara Lengel, “Arab Women, Social Media, and the Arab Spring: Applying 
the Framework of Digital Reflexivity to Analyze Gender and Online Activism,” Journal of International 
Women’s Studies 13, no. 5 (2012): 37. 
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be represented in smaller numbers in the Middle East cyber domain, their presence online 
is reflective of more than a decade of training and education initiatives on a global and 
regional scale. 
As early as 1992, women’s organizations began to incorporate email and 
conferencing.6 In 1995 the Fourth World Conference in Beijing demonstrated the desire 
of women’s Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to use email for coordination, and 
by 1997, the Global Knowledge Conferences began to focus on ways ahead for gender 
and Internet Communications Technologies.7 Women’s use of technology in the Middle 
East is not a new issue; in fact, the last decade has offered a series of conferences devoted 
to women and technology hosted in multiple Arab countries.8  
Clearly, many Middle Eastern countries’ promotion of women’s use of ICT 
education may be disingenuous, a means to influence international support instead of 
focusing on women’s rights.9 Yet, even if this is the case, the tangential effect is still a 
net benefit for women: women are being trained on ICT and are using these technologies, 
and have new opportunities to participate in social movements through ICT.10 As the 
Internet grows as a resource for the creation of political and cultural activism, individuals 
must understand how both activism online and activism in the local area works in order 
to employ ICT successfully in support of social movements.11 Skalli notes that women’s 
                                                 
6 Wendy Harcourt, Women@ Internet: Creating New Cultures in Cyberspace  (London: Zed Books, 
1999), 93–99. 
7 Ibid., 93–99. 
8 Loubna H. Skalli, “Communicating Gender in the Public Sphere: Women and Information 
Technologies in the Mena Region,”  Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 2, no. 2 (2006): 42–43, 51, 
retrieved November 15, 2013, from 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_middle_east_womens_studies/v002/2.2skalli.html. In 1999, the 
Arab Women Media Center was founded in Jordan, following this, Cairo hosted the Extraordinary Arab 
Women’s Summit in 2000, and Abu Dhabi hosted the first “Women and Media Forum” in 2002. The first 
regional conference on Women and Information/Communication Technologies (ICT) was held in Cairo in 
2003, which established the Information Technology Arab Regional Women Task Force to prepare for the 
World Summit of the Information Society in Tunisia. 
9 Harcourt, Women@ Internet, 217. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Arturo Escobar, “Gender, Place and Networks: A Political Ecology of Cyberculture,” in Harcourt, 
Women@ Internet, 32. 
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ICT training enables women with access to uncensored information, increases women’s 
activities and concerns both intra and extra regionally, and drives women to broaden their 
horizons.12 She further states that women in the Middle East are using the private spaces 
provided by Internet communities as places to organize, train, and coordinate activities.13 
Women, embedded in the daily life of their communities, understand the local networks, 
and with increased education and ICT training may be well suited to link local and online 
networks.14 
The challenge, however, despite the appeal of the Internet, lies in the literacy and 
status of women in the Arab world, as well as the censorship of the Arab world from 
mass media.15 The Arab Social Media report identifies a gender gap in cyberspace: 
women’s Internet use in the Middle East, in particular social media tools such as 
Facebook, is lower than the global average. Regional opinion polls cite the two most 
significant reasons for this gap as societal or cultural limitations and privacy concerns; 
national opinion polls reflect a similar trend with an even greater focus on 
societal/cultural limitations.16 Issues with the perception of women’s empowerment also 
create challenges. Newsom and Lengel argue that gendered messages lose their influence 
as western media adopts them, asserting that as messages lose their power, their authors 
are marginalized, and the messages are reconstructed to fit in a global, instead of local, 
narrative.17 Many female activists, such as Tawakkol Karman and Asmaa Mahfouz were 
lauded for their bravery by the western world, yet their Islamic beliefs, or in Karman’s 
case years of participation in Islamist charities and activities that resonate with local 
                                                 
12 Skalli, “Communicating Gender,” 51. 
13 Ibid., 37–38. 
14 Valentine M Moghadam, Globalization and Social Movements: Islamism, Feminism, and the 
Global Justice Movement  (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 123. 
15 Harcourt, Women@ Internet, 214–216. 
16 “Social Media in Arab Women’s Empowerment,” in Arab Social Media Report, 5. 
17 Newsom and Lengel, “Arab Women, Social Media, and the Arab Spring,” 32. 
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cultural narratives, frequently went unmentioned.18 They view the use of online 
communities by women as a form of “contained empowerment” as it may not result in 
empowerment offline, since social norms that are suspended online come into play again 
in the real world, thus limiting opportunities for change.19 Whether women are truly 
empowered online or not, their participation still offers an opportunity to set an 
alternative and potentially nonviolent agenda, diversify the protest repertoire, create more 
inclusive group identities, better communicate an agenda to a wider audience, and 
develop trust networks that lower barriers to protest as will be shown below. 
2. Significance of Women’s Participation in Online Activism  
Assessing the influence women exert in social movements through social media 
may provide indicators of the potential a protest movement has for success. In the Middle 
East, where gender segregation is common, the gender—neutral space of the Internet 
provides a forum for women to circumvent social barriers and participate in public 
discourse.20 This participation can shape female perceptions of the grievances of a social 
movement, create a sense of connection with other protestors, and make women more 
prone to collective action. Female participation through social media in social movements 
can plausibly influence key factors related to movement success. 
Studying women’s participation in social movements in general can help assess 
the possibility for the use of violent tactics within a movement. Studies show that 
nonviolent protest movements are twice as successful as violent protest movements, and 
nonviolent movements experience a greater potential for democratic transition if a regime 
is overthrown and are less likely to experience civil war than violent movements.21 
Women have a preference for nonviolence and apparently influence movements in a 
                                                 
18 Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope(New York: Polity Press, 2012), 53–56; Stacy 
Philbrick Yadav, “Tawakkul Karman as Cause and Effect,” Middle East Research and Information Project 
(2011), retrieved May 15, 2013, from http://www.merip.org/mero/mero102111. 
19 Ibid., 38. 
20 “Social Media in Arab Women’s Empowerment,” in Arab Social Media Report, 9. 
21 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of 
Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 35, 201–202. 
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nonviolent direction. A recent study on factors influencing the choice of nonviolent 
protest repertoires indicates that “gender inclusive ideologies” have a strong correlation 
to peaceful protest tactics.22 Research also shows that women have a more negative 
reaction to violence and war compared to men, and have a preference for peace.23 
Additional research shows an important indicator of a state’s potential to be less 
militaristic is associated with higher levels of gender equality.24 If women do bring a 
preference for nonviolence into a more gender equivalent forum such as the Internet, they 
may help shape collective action within a movement, to include influencing the conduct 
of physical protests and the use of violence tactics. 
In determining how women use social media during social movements and the 
consequential impact, more robust assessments of the diversity, resilience, and strength of 
a social movement need to be made. Female participation in a social movement adds 
diversity to the group, which increases the resilience of the movement and its ability to 
survive regime repression and adapt to changing circumstances.25 If women are using 
social media as tool to participate in social movements, the means by and extent to which 
they influence protest strategies may indicate a social movement’s potential for success. 
With the increasing involvement of cyber operations and planning in US strategy, 
understanding gendered participation on social media may provide a window into the 
dynamics and actors who can minimize negative and violent outcomes. As the US 
government places more emphasis on political, economic, and social programs that 
include women, the ability to effectively identify and engage the most influential females 
in a group or organization will be critical to the success of these initiatives. Recognizing 
                                                 
22 Victor Asal, Richard Legault, Ora Szekely, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, “Gender Ideologies and 
Forms of Contentious Mobilization in the Middle East,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 (2013): 315. 
23 Pamela Jonson Conover and Virginia Sapiro, “Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War,” 
American Journal of Political Science 37, no. 4 (1993): 1096-1097, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111544; 
Yaacov B. Yablon, “Gender Differences in the Consistency of Attitudes towards Peace,” Women’s Studies 
International Forum 32, no 4 (2009): 305–310, retrieved December 12, 2012, from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/02775395/32/4. 
24 Mary Caprioli, “Gendered Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 1 (2000): 63, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/425725. 
25 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 39–40. 
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the effectiveness of female social media use in social movements can help tailor US 
strategy and policy for both strategic and operational planning assessments. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several strands of literature are relevant to understanding a potential differential 
impact of women’s use of social media in social movements in the Middle East. Three 
primary literature concentrations contribute to this research question: social movements, 
social media and virtual networks, and female involvement in social movements. Each of 
these literatures has some common insights:  social media can be used to enhance social 
movements, female participation in social movements has the potential to change the 
composition of a movement, thereby increasing the chances of success, and women in 
recent protests have been active on social media. As these themes begin to overlap, 
questions arise, such as, do women bring an active preference for nonviolence into online 
social movement discourse?26 Do women bring a different physical network of associates 
into the world of social media with them, and does that increase the size and diversity of 
online social movements? Given the gender segregation of public and private spaces, are 
women using the Internet to circumvent cultural limitations and enter the public 
sphere?27 If they are using the Internet to engage in public debate, are women also 
strategically employing the Internet and social media to reach different audiences, 
international media, members of online groups, or potential online activists? If violent 
protests or household responsibilities inhibit women’s mobilization, how are they using 
social media to voice their support for protests, and are their efforts effective?28 The 
research on social movement theory, social media use, and women’s engagement in both 
may provide some potential insights. After reviewing the three central themes, this 
review will focus on concepts that overlap between the camps. 
                                                 
26 Conover and Sapiro, “Gender, Feminist Consciousness and War,” 1096–1097. 
27 Radsch, “Unveiling the Revolutionaries,” 36, 40. 
28 Ibid., 35–36.  
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1. Social Movements 
Studies on social movements in the Middle East identify collective action that is 
nonviolent as a critical factor in successful social movements, and nonviolence can 
potentially be enhanced through social media use and more specifically through female 
participation. Studies on social movements widely recognize such movements as 
informally organized groups of individuals lacking political representation, possessing 
specific complaints, and having objectives for change. Tilly’s definition of social 
movements encompasses many of these facets: he defines social movements as: 
A sustained series of interactions between power holders and persons 
successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal 
representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly visible 
demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back 
those demands with public demonstrations of support.29  
In keeping with the main points of this definition, uprisings in the Middle East 
against authoritarian regimes fit well within these standards, to include the Palestinian 
Intifadas, Egypt’s Kefaya movement in 2005, and the protests that swept the Middle East 
during the Arab Spring. With the second Intifada being the exception, the majority of the 
aforementioned uprisings are noteworthy for the absence of significant violence on the 
part of the protestors. 
Nonviolent collective action has been studied and identified as a crucial element 
to the success of social movements against authoritarian regimes. Sharp defines 
nonviolent struggle as society’s use of economic, political, psychological, and social 
power to undercut a regime’s authority, and contends that nonviolence is uniquely suited 
to forcing change in repressive regimes.30 The “repertoire” or ways of mobilizing of such 
protests can incorporate almost 200 different techniques, including strikes, boycotts, 
                                                 
29 Charles Tilly, “Social Movements and National Politics,” in Statemaking and Social Movements: 
Essays in History and Theory, eds. Charles Bright and Susan Friend Harding(Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 1984), 297–317. 
30 Gene Sharp, “From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation,” Albert 
Einstein Institution(2003): 38, retrieved October 15, 2012, from 
http://www.aeinstein.org/organizations892f.html. 
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protests, stay-aways, sit-ins and other forms of non-violent protests.31 Sharp’s discourse 
on undermining the pillars of support that repressive regimes rely on to secure their 
power through diverse methods has been promoted throughout many regions of the 
world, including the Middle East. 
In studies on the comparative potential that nonviolent social movements have to 
achieve the desired objective, Chenoweth and Stephen found that nonviolent movements 
have a 53 percent chance of success compared to a 23 percent chance of success in 
violent movements.32 Chenoweth and Stephen stress that while there are failed 
nonviolent campaigns as well as successful violent campaigns, nonviolent social 
movements have a higher potential for success than violent campaigns when there is 
wide, diverse participation.33 Additionally, participation influences the success of a social 
movement. Nonviolent movements provide an advantage over violent movements as they 
encourage greater participation, as there are fewer challenges with respect to “moral, 
physical, informational, or commitment” issues of the participants.34 Nonviolent 
campagins present a wider array of options and opportunties to participate as well as 
provide openings for women, elderly, and minority groups to to participate.35 
The Arab Spring protests represent the most recent iteration of predominantly 
nonviolent social movements within the Middle East, the protests experienced some 
success in either ousting the regime or gaining more political freedom. Stephen identifies 
that nonviolent social movements in the Middle East are common, detailing case studies 
of nonviolent civil resistance throughout the region including Egypt, Iran, and the 
Occupied Territories.36 The first Palestinian Intifada during the late 1980s demonstrated 
                                                 
31 Sharp, “From Dictatorship to Democracy,” 78–79. 
32 Maria J. Stephen and Erica Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of 
Nonviolent Conflict,” International Security 33, no. 1 (2008): 8, retrieved November 1, 2012, from 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v033/33.1.stephan.html. 
33 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 39. 
34 Ibid., 35. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Maria J. Stephan, Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the 
Middle East(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 8–9. 
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the impact of noncooperation and its ability to produce a rich, unified, civil society.37 
While the Intifada’s objective of a Palestinian state did not occur, the Intifada was 
successful in disrupting Israeli society. Notably, Palestinian leadership met with Sharp in 
1989 to refine and implement an effective strategy of nonviolent struggle.38 The Arab 
Spring protests applied similar techniques of nonviolent struggle, and employed many of 
Sharp’s recommendations in conjunction with modern media and communications 
technology to engage a diverse body of protestors in their collective action repertoire. 
Women were part of the diverse body of protestors both on the Internet and in the streets. 
2. Social Media and Networks 
Studies show that social media can facilitate extensive collective action but it can 
also weaken collective action networks. Though used extensively in the Arab Spring, 
social media is not viewed as crucial to the success of the uprisings. Social media can 
produce diverse, participative, networks that can be used to organize and develop 
elements of a social movement. Anklam identifies the capacity for technology to 
establish interactions that form relationships, stating that the Web 2.0 is both “universally 
available and deeply participative,” which inherently provides networks with high levels 
of transparency, diversity, and openness.39 She also notes the importance of human 
capital including individual knowledge, skills, and experiences, structural capital 
consisting of the processes, procedures and structures crucial to network function, and 
relational capital built upon the value of an organization.40 Anklam does not specify 
whether the value of network growth and shared experience changes between virtual and 
actual networks. 
Bennett argues that while the use of Internet technology can contribute to social 
movements, it also facilitates weak ties and can damage campaigns. He also posits that 
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the ease of entry and exit into networks by virtue of digital communications may 
negatively affect the capacity to control a campaign or create a collective identity that 
supports movement longevity; thus women’s use of social media would do little to 
enhance a social movement.41 However, Bennett also recognizes that the Internet favors 
“resource—poor players,” increases opportunities to join activist organizations, and 
Internet campaigns allow activists to plan and coordinate more opportunities for both 
virtual and physical mobilization.42 Whether Internet use in a campaign has a positive or 
negative impact, Bennett ultimately argues that “resource poor organizations may be 
defined in important ways by their Internet presence.”43 
Van Laer and Van Aelst also discuss the weak ties digital communications 
produce. They posit that the reduced level of trust required among protest participants is 
potentially damaging to a social movement; however, they also acknowledge that the 
Internet has encouraged the creation of a digital repertoire for, and lowered barriers to, 
collective action in social movements.44 They hold the view that the Internet serves in a 
“facilitating” capacity, making traditional forms of collective action easier to coordinate 
and lowering barriers to protest, as well as in a “creative” capacity, producing diversity 
though new tactics and information diffusion.45 While Bennett, Van Laer, and Van 
Aelst’s studies show that digital networks may be ineffective tools for women to engage 
in social movement dialogue, they also indicate that digital networks may lower barriers 
for women to participate in social movements. 
Recent studies on social movement application of social media in the Middle East 
reflect the aforementioned dichotomy and concede that social media is a useful tool, but 
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it is not an indispensable tool for the success of social movements.46 Findings did not 
indicate that social media use affected the success of mass protests; however, research did 
show that the civil societies formed by Internet communities likely increased 
participation to a degree and gained international attention.47 Studies found social media 
helped organize protests, communicate to the world, and bolster the traditional 
mechanisms for driving collective action.48 
Reports on social media use in the Arab Spring cite the underlying social, 
economic, and political conditions as the causes for the protests; however, each study 
acknowledges that the Internet, social media, or new communications technology did 
affect how movements organized, coordinated, or discussed activity. A Stanford 
University study noted the underlying causes of the Arab Spring, but still noted that 
social media provided forums for activists to coordinate, discuss, and disseminate 
information, stressing the capacity for social media to create virtual civil societies.49 
Peaceworks offered a similar conclusion, stating that while new media did play a role in 
the Arab Spring uprisings, it did not play a significant role in mobilizing activists or 
inspiring other uprisings in the region.50 The study further observes that the effects of 
new media in the Arab spring did have a significant role in spreading information extra-
regionally, linking activists to the public masses, and spreading local news to 
international news outlets.51 
One of the notable effects of social media on recent social movement organization 
is the growing participation of women in social media as part of protest movements. 
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Studies stress the diversity and innovation they bring to social movements through 
cyberactivism.52 Radsch studies how women participated in social movements through 
social media, and cited case studied throughout the Middle East of women who blogged, 
Tweeted, and used Facebook to participate in the Arab Spring uprisings.53 Her study 
indicates that women who used social media in support of social movements were eager 
to participate, shared a sense of connection to others in the movement, and wanted to 
inform others about the movement’s goals and actions.54 There is evidence that women 
played a key role in recent social movements such as the Arab Spring, both virtually and 
physically, but the actual effectiveness of their contributions have yet to be quantified. 
3. Women and Social Movements 
In the Middle East, gender segregation represents a distinct challenge to female 
participation in public life and collective action. Roth contends that one of the significant 
challenges women face in social movements, whether driven by one or both genders, is a 
consensus that the public sphere is often male—driven, while the private social sphere 
belongs to females.55 Thus, female participation in social movements affects both the 
public sphere, as well as private life at home, posing a greater challenge and threat to 
existing social norms as well as political orders.56 As women gain more access to social 
media, their participation in social movements through social media will grow, contribute 
to these movements, and challenge traditional gender norms. Social media may provide a 
way for women to effectively voice their opinions in protest movements without 
challenging social or cultural mores that would otherwise restrict participation. 
Social media participation by women is not a break from the past. Female 
participation in social movements has been a factor in recent social movements in the 
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Middle East, providing women with opportunities to learn how to contribute to social 
movements and collective action. One of the earliest instances of significant female 
participation in social movements in the region took place during the first Palestinian 
Intifada. Women took assumed leading role in the Intifadas, leading civil society 
organizations, creating grass roots institutions, and appearing regularly at strikes, 
protests, and demonstrations. They often served as couriers and coordinators between 
different groups; their extensive participation from the inception of the social movement 
shifted the relationships between Palestinian men and women in public life.57 In other 
examples, women in Egypt participated in the Kefaya movement in 2005, Persian women 
formed part of the Green Revolution in Iran in 2009, and Saudi women protested for their 
right to drive in 2010.58 
Women’s presence on the Internet and in social media is growing in the Middle 
East, albeit slowly. This increased presence enables women to bring new discourse to 
virtual public forums. Skalli details the continuing evolution of female Internet use in the 
Middle East with respect to activist movements, in particular through diverse 
communications methods and techniques. She states that modern media is offering 
women a new forum to discuss gender, societal, economic, and political issues. 
Ultimately, Skalli claims “The impact of women’s interventions and initiatives are often 
more subtle and symbolic than openly radical or revolutionary—this is precisely how 
women activists bargain with the structures of patriarchy in the MENA.”59 Access to the 
new forum of the Internet, however, is limited for many women. A 2002 sampling of 
women in the Middle East identified that women at the time lagged behind men in their 
use of the Internet due to challenges in literacy, computer literacy, physical access to 
computers, and sociocultural constraints. Of the women that were regular Internet users, 
they represented an elite, educated, professional class of women that used the Internet 
primarily for work and secondarily for entertainment and to connect with friends and 
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family.60 While some of the constraints on female Internet use may still remain, the Arab 
Social Media Report indicates a common belief that social media may help balance out 
genders. More than 80 percent of both male and female respondents believed that social 
media made it easier for Arab women to communicate their opinions as well as 
participate in civil society. This supports the idea that women do have a voice in a social 
movement through their use of social media.61 
The incorporation of women into Middle Eastern social movements resulted in 
more women seeking opportunities for participation, including opportunities to 
participate through the use of the Internet and social media. Radsch’s study of women’s 
cyber activism during the Arab Spring presents a wide array of examples of female 
participation through social media. She explored the ways that women communicated 
through social media, to include specifically targeting international media, bridging the 
Arabic-English divide, Yemeni women using video dumps to get social media footage 
onto regional television, and Libyan women spamming journalists and commentators in 
order to amplify their message.62 She cites the perception of gender equality on the 
Internet and contends that cyber activism may be more socially acceptable than physical 
mobilization into the public sphere.63 
4. Intersections Between Social Movements, Social Media, and Gender 
Participation 
Women’s participation in social movements, as well as the use of social media to 
participate in social movements, has potential to enhance many of the factors that 
contribute to the success of collective action, including nonviolent action, diversity and 
innovation, the creation of group identities, communication, and lowering costs and 
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barriers to participation.64 These junctures represent indicators that may identify if and 
how women’s use of social media while participating in social movements contributes to 
movement success. 
a. Nonviolence 
Successful nonviolent collective action requires wide, diverse participation 
that includes the involvement of women and minorities. Inclusive participation can be 
coordinated and reinforced through the use of social media. A recent study of factors that 
influence the use of violence showed a strong correlation between organizations with 
“gender inclusive ideologies” and a propensity to select nonviolent protest repertoires, 
indicating that positive views of women’s participation can lead to more peaceful protest 
activity.65 In addition to less violent protests, the gendering of a protest movement may 
decrease the perception of the movement as a threat, which may lower the possibility of 
violent repression by security forces.66 Nonviolent campaigns present a wider array of 
options and opportunities for participation, to include opportunities for women and 
elderly citizens to participate.67  
If the protest repertoire is varied and contains lower—risk activities, wider 
participation can be solicited.68 This not only increases the size of the protest movement, 
but also increases the variety of skills and knowledge that participants bring to the 
movement. Nonviolent movements also create less disruption to daily life, enabling 
people to continue with their jobs and feed their families. 
Social media can create the perception of mass participation in a protest 
and spread news of regime repression, creating backlash against the government, and 
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further engendering support.69 If social media is used to coordinate protests, instructions 
to protestors can be communicated to a wider audience, laying some of the groundwork 
for how a protest is executed and the level of violence. Additionally, if the virtual 
network includes women, women are included in discourse and as studies of the Arab 
Spring have shown, and may mobilize virtually or physically.70 Both social media and 
female participation in social movements can enhance nonviolent collective action. When 
women participate in online social movement discourse, they have an opportunity to 
influence the conduct of collective action. 
b. Diversity and Innovation 
The incorporation of both genders in a social movement as well as the use 
of social media to solicit knowledge from a large, mixed-gender pool of supporters and 
participants enhances the diversity and innovation of a social movement. The diversity of 
participants brings innovation and resilience to a social movement. Diversity in gender, 
age, religion, and ethnicity can undermine a regime’s ability to surgically coerce a 
segment of society into cooperating.71 As a social movement gains participants, the 
potential for heterogeneity and consequently, diversity, innovation, and movement 
resilience grows. Studies on critical mass and collective action note that there is a small 
subset of resource contributors within a group that form the “critical mass” necessary to 
produce collective action; however, the effectiveness of that group increases with the 
diversity of the population participating in that collective action.72 Furthermore, research 
found that group size, heterogeneity, and dense social ties all increased the potential for 
collective action.73 
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Group heterogeneity can facilitate access to a wider range of knowledge 
and skills. Research on applying “critical mass” to interactive media identifies that the 
requisite interaction and reciprocation that is part of the nature of interactive media 
creates increased benefits for participants as participant contributions increase. This 
“accelerating production function” is due to the interests, resources, and heterogeneity 
involved in the interaction.74 Essentially, more participation, leads to more benefits for 
the group, which increases activity within the group, which encourages more contribution 
and participation. 
Additional studies on the use of the Internet and social and media in social 
movements continue to stress the importance of diversity and innovation to enhance 
narratives and develop new participation methods. Bennett argues that digital networks 
form weak ties through narratives instead of ideology, but notes that the diversity of 
individual identity bolsters these ideologically thin connections.75 The Internet and 
features such as social media serve as a tool that, by virtue of being a “many-to-many” 
medium, engenders diversity and reduces contributor costs.76 A study on chat channel 
survival identified that it was not the number of participants, but the heterogeneity of 
participants that was most significant indicator of channel longevity and survival, noting 
that the diversity of the participants formed early and was a predominant indicator for 
survival of the virtual chat networks.77 Participation of both genders in these virtual and 
physical networks increases heterogeneity. Skalli contends that women are using modern 
media to diversify their participation methods in activist movements and cites the 
increasing prominence of the Internet with the growth of Internet cafes and opportunities 
for technological education.78 Qualitative studies detail the diverse techniques women 
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brought to social movements in the Middle East. The quantitative effect of their efforts 
on shaping collective action is harder to discern.79 If women are regular participants in 
social movements online, they can contribute both to group heterogeneity and the 
interaction between members of the group, which increases the benefits to those 
participating in group discourse as well as the chance of movement longevity.  
c. Creation of Group Identities 
Participation in social movement discourse through social media shapes 
group identities for a wide audience. The participation of both sexes in online discourse 
can shape the group narrative around which a community mobilizes. In their examination 
of social movements, Porta and Diani identify two methods of analyzing collective action 
and culture, the first being through values that activists pair with concerns and the second 
being the ways that actors place meaning on experiences.80 The values and meanings of 
collective action are part of the creation of group identity, which is essential to collective 
action.81 Bennett notes that digital networks, through the creation of narratives, can 
reinforce group identities.82 Social media and modern communications can reinforce the 
creation and communication of group identities. As interactive media participation 
encourages activity, and that activity for one member constitutes participation for 
another, the participation of a diverse group of people can shape group identity through 
these interactions.83 When women participate in discourse through the gender-neutral 
space of social media, they have the potential to influence group identity. 
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d. Communications 
Studies show that social movements in the Middle East employed the 
Internet and social media to improve communication and coordination between group 
members. Along with this adaptation, women have also demonstrated their willingness to 
participate in online communication. The communication methods that social media 
offers can help shape social movements, allowing communications to circumvent regime 
oppression, link groups, and coordinate collective action faster. Sharp’s resistance 
techniques for social intervention, lists “Alternate Social Institutions” and “Alternate 
Communications Systems,” which many of the features of modern communications 
technology facilitate.84  
In the first Palestinian Intifada, paper communiqués were issued from 
local leadership; in the Arab Spring, Facebook and Twitter served as an alternate form of 
communication. Stephan cites the Egyptian Kefaya movement in 2005, and later the 
April 6 civil strikes as applications of nonviolent protest that took advantage of new 
communications technology such as the growing Internet to communicate to a wider 
population for mobilization and support.85 Stephan stresses the importance of using 
communications to engage activists as well as movement supporters, neutral groups, and 
opponent supporters.86 Stephen conveys that modern communications technology is 
being used to engage activists and non-activists alike, emphasizing shared values and 
engaging other supporters.87 
Bennett offers a counterpoint that given the thin ties of digital networks, 
there is a greater chance for disrupted communications and confusion; however he does 
recognize the benefits of digital communication in network coordination and resilience. 
He states, “The same qualities that make these communication-based politics durable also 
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make them vulnerable to problems of control, decision-making, and collective 
identity.”88 A Stanford University study argued that social media provided forums for 
social activists to coordinate, discuss, and disseminate information.89 Radsch cites a 
plethora of examples of how women used the Internet for social activism, however, there 
is little quantitative information on how and why women were successful in their cyber 
activism.90 Women’s use of social media creates prospects to expand communication to 
other activists and non-activists as well as enhance movement resilience. 
e. Lowering Costs and Barriers to Protest 
There is evidence that the use of social media and Internet technologies in 
social movements may help lower costs and barriers to protest, which can lead to larger 
crowds and more diverse participants, to include encouraging the participation of women. 
The Internet serves in a “facilitating” capacity, making traditional forms of collective 
action easier to coordinate and lowering barriers to protest, as well as in a “creative” 
capacity, producing diversity though new tactics and information diffusion; however, the 
weak ties digital communications produce may also reduce the level of trust required 
among protest participants.91 The Egyptian Kefaya movement also applied the Internet as 
a low—risk means to mobilize support.92 Social media gives activists a means to notify a 
large audience of potential threats, violence, or repression, thereby allowing people to 
mobilize with more situational awareness. Additionally, the Internet and social media 
provides women with a means to support social movements both by staying informed and 
physically mobilizing, or in the case where women’s physical participation is restricted, 
social media provides women with a means to virtually support a campaign. As Radsch 
observes regarding female participation in the Libyan revolution, “Cyber activism 
enabled women to play a role in the revolution without going into the streets, translating 
                                                 
88 Bennett, “Communicating Global Activism,” 151, 164. 
89 Dewey et al., “Impact of Social Media,” 32. 
90 Radsch, “Unveiling the Revolutionaries.” 
91 Van Laer and Van Aelst, “Internet and Social Movement Repertoires,” 3, 15. 
92 Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 208. 
 22 
street activism by men into cyber activism by women.”93  While social, familial, and 
cultural constraints may hamper female Internet use, women are using social media as a 
method to participate or gain information on social movements and consequently taking 
part in various forms of collective action, which subsequently influences the diversity and 
discourse of an organization.94 
f. Summary 
Women are using social media as a means to participate in social 
movements, they engage in activist discourse and activities online, which adds diversity, 
shapes narratives, and brings innovation to social movements. The application of the 
Internet and social media as a communication tool can enhance many of the qualities 
necessary for successful social movements, including nonviolent collective action, 
increasing diversity and innovation, creating group narratives and identities, facilitating 
communication, and lowering barriers to protests. Additionally, women have played a 
role in these social movements through social media and use the Internet as a less 
restrictive space to participate in social movements. The repertoire women applied 
through social media thus far in support of social movements in the Middle East is 
largely supported through anecdotal evidence; however, the differential impact of 
women’s efforts has yet to be quantified.   
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will evaluate the involvement of women on social media and their 
influence in the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt in January 2011 and Yemen and Bahrain 
in February 2011. Each of these uprisings represents a nationalist social movement where 
activists employed social media to coordinate, communicate, and garner support for 
protests. Each uprising also represents a protest where female activists employed social 
media. I will be using statistical analysis, computer mapping, and secondary research to 
evaluate these events and women’s participation. 
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These uprisings and associated social networks will be evaluated through Naval 
Postgraduate School Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab 
methodologies, with a focus on the Twitter social media platform. The CORE Lab studies 
network—based organizations to analyze and identify the relationships between members 
of organizations and networks. Twitter is a “real time network” where people 
communicate through micro-blogs or messages known as Tweets.95 The network enables 
people to publicly broadcast information, links, pictures, and videos with individuals, 
groups, or a wider community.96 The network is scale-free,97 a type of network where a 
small group of individuals have many connections to other actors and may even produce 
a significant portion of traffic while most of the individuals in the network have very few 
connections and produce very little.98 In applying this concept to a Twitter network, most 
users produce very few Tweets directed to others, while a small group of individuals 
produce the majority of the Tweets. As Oliver and Marwell note, the effectiveness of this 
“critical mass” increases with group diversity.99 
The information I will be analyzing is publicly available and deliberately 
transmitted by users. Thus, the spread of this information and how people connect to each 
other may indicate which individuals and groups hold greater influence. In order for this 
data to be falsified, additional Tweets and Twitter users would need to be incorporated 
into the historical Twitter data samples I will be using. I will be using samples of Twitter 
data from individuals in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain to determine who is influential.  
These samples will encompass a two-week period consisting of the day of peak 
protest in each country, as well as one week prior to and one week following that protest 
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date where data is available.100 The data samples consist of Tweets from January 23 to 
February 6, 2011 from Egypt, Tweets from January 26 to February 10, 2011 from 
Yemen, and Tweets from February 7 until February 21, 2011 from Bahrain.101 
The data set represents a one—time query from January 23 to February 22, 2011, 
filtered by first by protest-related Hashtags, or keywords marked with a “#” used to 
categorize messages and enable those interested in a topic to receive information, will be 
used to identify protest-specific Tweets.102 Following this, geoinferencing will be used to 
select only Tweets that originate Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen.103 The data will be further 
scrubbed to remove media, organizations, misidentified locations, and androgynous 
accounts. The resultant data set of Tweets from each country will be predominantly 
originated by users in the country, throughout a 14-day window that is relevant to each 
protest. 
Using the refined data set, a pool of the most prevalent male and female Twitter 
users will be extracted based on their total degree centrality, or the total number of 
directional ties a user has connecting them to other users.104 After identifying the subset 
of male and female users to analyze, social network analysis programs will be used to 
compare measures of centrality. Centrality measures are equations used to determine how 
centrally located and potentially influential, actors are within a social space.105 The 
numerical centrality scores will be compared to identify differences between male and 
female users in connectedness, information brokerage potential, and other forms of 
influence. These numerical scores may provide an indication of the different levels of 
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influence between men and women in the data sets, if differences exist. These scores may 
provide indicators as to whether women were influential during the Arab Spring protests. 
These scores may also indicate whether there is a difference in male and female influence 
online. 
User activity will also be compared between the male and female Twitter users.  
These measures are provided within the data set and include the number of accounts a 
user follows, the number of accounts that follow a user, the number of Tweets sent out, 
the text of each Tweet, and the number of times a Tweet is Retweeted, or relayed by 
another user to their group of followers. This information may provide more details on 
the differences in communication strategies by men and women in these protest 
movements. 
By assessing the Twitter data sets, this thesis may identify some of the differences 
in influence between men and women in the Middle Eastern online activist networks, 
what factors make female use of social media successful or unsuccessful, and whether 
there is a differential impact in women’s use of social media in social movements. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Evidence indicates that women exercised some form of influence and were 
engaged in mobilization both on and offline during the Arab Spring uprisings. This thesis 
ascertains that women physically mobilized to participate in the Arab Spring protests in 
Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain. In Egypt and Bahrain, women also mobilized virtually using 
social media. In Yemen women participated through traditional forms of social 
mobilization, in part, due to lack of access, infrastructure, and training on Internet 
Communications Technologies. 
This thesis will demonstrate that online protest networks in Egypt and Bahrain 
indicate women did participate in virtual mobilization during the Arab Spring. In general, 
data indicates women communicate out to others more often than they received 
information from others. Furthermore, women in both countries followed more than 
double the number of accounts men followed, thus receiving information from more 
numerous, diverse sources. Women represented nearly fifty percent of the most 
 26 
connected users Egyptian protest Twitter networks. Egyptian women directed 
communications to others more than twice as much as male users, whereas Egyptian men 
received communications from others more than three times as often. An assessment of 
Bahraini online protest activity reveals that women represented less than one-fourth of 
the most connected users. Women in Bahrain communicated out to others more often 
than men in Bahrain; however, in terms of total communications, they communicated less 
than their male counterparts. Taken as a whole, women in Egypt and Bahrain participated  
in online social mobilization during the Arab Spring, and this participation also 
contributed to the diversity of information and the communication within virtual protest 
networks. 
The following chapters will discuss the how women can influence social 
mobilization, review case studies for Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen, evaluate the available 
Twitter data sets, and provide a discussion of the results of that analysis. The next chapter 
will discuss women’s influence on social mobilization in terms of nonviolence, diversity 
and innovation, collective identity, communication, and lowered barriers to protest. The 
third chapter will review each case study and discuss the events, relevant social 
movement concepts, the role of social media, and the role of women in the protests. The 
fourth chapter will provide analysis of each of the Twitter data sets, and this thesis will 




II. GENDERED CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
SUCCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION: ARE WOMEN ORCHESTRATORS? 
Social movements engage individuals and networks of people to mobilize, protest, 
and demand change. These networks rely on orchestrators to sustain, improve, and grow 
the network’s membership, interactions, and productivity.106 Orchestrators are people 
who act as entrepreneurs, advocates, mentors, and constant communicators within the 
network in order to lower costs of participation, establish the details of ideas and group 
identity, and develop personal relationships between individuals and groups.107 Studies 
of interaction during negotiations and communications exercises reveal that each gender 
uses different communication skills and tactics; these differences may make women well 
suited to serve as orchestrators or choreographers within social movement networks.108 
The significant division between the male-dominated public sphere and the female-
dominated private sphere in Middle Eastern society may also shape the ways women 
participate in and influence social movements. If women do have a differential impact on 
social movements and their organizations, then studying the contributions of women in 
the online networks supporting the Arab Spring protests may provide insight into their 
possible roles as network orchestrators. 
While there are social movements that address women’s issues, this thesis deals 
specifically with social movements in the Middle East where the demands are not gender-
specific, for example, nationalist movements. In gender-specific mobilization, we would 
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expect one gender to play a more central role. The use of non-gender mobilization in this 
study compares male and female mobilization and thus can determine differences 
between the genders. Female participation in such social movements can shape and 
reinforce the factors that contribute to social movement success. In particular, women’s 
participation in protests may encourage the use of nonviolent protest repertoires, which 
subsequently increases the potential for protest success.109 Concurrently, the employment 
of a nonviolent repertoire creates opportunities for female participation. Women also 
contribute to the diversity and innovation of a protest movement through their 
participation and their influence in different spheres of life. Women’s focus on building 
consensus and tactics in negotiation studies indicate that women may help shape 
inclusive group identities that also contribute to the success of a social movement.110 
Thus, female communication skills may express collective identities in a less divisive 
way, leading to larger mobilizations and therefore creating more potential for success. 
Finally, the trust networks that women build, the cooperation skills women demonstrate, 
and the potential for gendered tactics to reduce repression serve to lower the barriers to 
participation.111 This can bring marginalized groups into a protest movement, thereby 
adding to the mass, diversity, and resilience of a movement which ultimately can 
influence its success. With their preferences and tactics, women may shape the discourse 
and actions of a social movement to promote nonviolent, diverse repertories and 
communicate inclusive collective identities that contribute to movement resilience and 
success. 
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B. WOMEN’S MOBILIZATION AND NONVIOLENCE: PREFERENCES, 
PRACTICES, AND OUTCOMES 
Women’s participation in a social movement may influence the selection and 
execution of protest repertoires, since female preferences for non-violent, less costly 
protest can influence the level of violence. Nonviolent protest campaigns create less 
disruption in daily life, enable people to participate in the campaigns and continue to 
work or care for their families, and provide varied methods of participation.112 Protest 
repertoires that enable women to fulfill family obligations also present less of a threat to 
the domestic status quo, which enables women in a patriarchal society to participate 
without creating objections or repercussions from male family members.113 Furthermore, 
the capacities of women to influence aspects of daily life facilitate the employment of a 
variety of non-violent protest tactics including boycotts and neighborhood—based 
initiatives, making a movement more resilient and less vulnerable to repression.114 In 
online social movement communities, evidence suggests women also participate in and 
orchestrate community dialogue.115 
As women engage in social movement organizations, their participation in social 
movement debate and dialogue can shape decisions regarding repertoire selection, 
choices to employ non-violent tactics, and implementation of group choices. Gender 
studies on approaches to conflict and negotiation indicate that women approach the 
challenges by focusing on relationship building and collaborative negotiation styles. In 
general, studies show that when evaluating an issue or conducting negotiations, males 
focus on tasks and competition and females focus on relationships and the impacts of 
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goals on others.116 International negotiation studies also stress the preferences towards 
collaborative negotiation styles by women and conflictual negotiation styles by men.117 
This is not to imply that women are less competitive, but whereas men use the context of 
goals to develop strategies, women view their strategies in terms of creating and 
sustaining relationships.118 It is possible that the combination of both task—oriented and 
relationship—oriented approaches to discourse in a social movement can influence 
repertoire selection among members of a protest movement instead of only a single 
dominant approach. My research indicates that the involvement of women in selecting 
and executing a protest repertoire may result in the consideration of a wider range of 
tasks, goals, and potential outcomes to include nonviolent repertoire choices. 
Along with the differences in female approaches to debate and negotiations, 
perceptions of female intentions may also influence the discourse and selection of protest 
repertoires. Research on a connection between women and peace in the context of the 
Arab Israeli conflict concludes that women are stereotypically portrayed as more peace—
oriented than men, (thus more credible regarding peace) and suggests that this may give 
women an advantage in their ability to promote and elicit support for peace proposals 
during negotiations.119 Additionally, women were more willing to participate in 
negotiations and presented positive attitudes towards peace encounters for longer periods 
of time than men in the study group.120 Women’s positive approach towards peace 
negotiations and their ability to elicit support are viewed in other studies as part of a 
“Gendered Evaluation Effect,” whereby the stereotypes of women as more peaceful 
changed opponents’ perceptions of compromises and negotiations; studies showed that 
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female compromises were viewed more favorably, female negotiators were viewed as 
more trustworthy, and female participation in peace negotiations can positively influence 
the outcome.121 As women engage in social movements, their disposition to collaborate 
more than their male counterparts in negotiations and their ability to elicit support for 
ideas may contribute to the selection and execution of a nonviolent protest repertoire. 
The use of nonviolent protest repertoires can encourage women’s participation 
because there are fewer challenges to the “moral, physical, informational, or 
commitment” issues of the participants, and women’s participation can also shape the 
contributions of other group members.122 Research indicates that women define 
themselves by their relationships more frequently than men, subsequently their behavior 
during group interaction focuses more on building and enhancing relationships.123 Other 
research findings noted that female groups employed emotions and personal testimony, as 
well as placed greater emphasis on responsibilities within the group.124 These traits may 
enable women to propose ideas and protest tactics that better address long—term 
strategies. 
As groups determine movement strategies, female contributions may encourage a 
more inclusive and holistic consideration of a wider array of repertoire ideas. Women’s 
participation in a group dialogue may encourage participation by other group members 
and set a tone of discourse and collaboration. Studies indicate that men contribute and 
cooperate more in groups where the groups are predominantly women, as opposed to all 
male or predominantly male.125 Women employ dialogue over debate or argument more 
frequently as a means to assess goals, which provides a less fixed, more flexible method 
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to discuss challenging issues.126 Not only can women influence the dynamics of 
repertoire selection, but their involvement can also encourage contributions by other 
group members. 
Women’s preferences for nonviolence and collaboration as well as their emphasis 
on collective responsibilities and relationships can shape elements of a protest repertoire, 
encourage wider participation and support, and contribute to the success of the 
movement. As Chenoweth and Stephen note, the greater level of participation in 
nonviolent social movements increases potential for mass participation and ultimately, 
improves the chances of success in a protest movement.127 As civil society gains territory 
in cyberspace, women who seek to organize or gain influence will likely do so as well. 
Should female preferences for nonviolence, collaboration, relationship building, and 
dialogue migrate into these online forums, it is possible that women will continue to 
shape protest movements in the virtual world, and that influence will have effects on the 
movement itself, the virtual debate, and physical mobilization. 
C. DIVERSITY, INNOVATION, AND WOMEN’S CONTRIBUTIONS 
Participation in social movements by both genders can create more resilient 
movement structures, produce more effective protest repertoires, and enable a movement 
to exert influence across a wider spectrum of daily life. Female employment of contextual 
thinking and inclusive dialogue has the potential to identify and discuss a more diverse 
range of protest tactics.128 Research has determined that women’s previous mobilization 
strategies employed various models of organization. Women’s marginalized status in 
society was a factor driving innovation, key to a dynamic social movement.129 The  
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contextual thinking, inclusive dialogue, and mobilization strategies of women transfer 
into online communities, contributing to diversity and innovation in social mobilization 
online. 
The different strategies men and women use to address problems and discuss 
solutions may contribute to a more diverse protest repertoire. These disparate strategies 
may also help produce innovative solutions to the challenges a social movement faces. As 
previously noted, men and women approach problems in different ways. Women tend to 
think more contextually compared to men, and this “web-thinking” enables women to 
connect more details, identify more options, and provide more points of view.130 This 
contextual thinking, along with the diversity in skills, life experiences, and perspectives 
women bring to a social group adds diversity. In the oft gender-segregated societies of 
Middle Eastern countries, the inclusion of women in an organization may not only add 
diversity, but also provide a movement with access to a different set of skills, talents, and 
social networks than it would otherwise have. Women’s participation in a social 
movement adds diversity, which increases the capacity for a movement to survive 
setbacks, creates new opportunties for innovation, and improves the capacity for a 
movement to disrupt civic life.131 Studies show that gender affects the substance of social 
and political interactions between people; Boyer notes, “Diversity in gender will thus 
bring with it diversity in viewpoints, and diversity in the way we consider the issues at 
hand.”132 
Furthermore, the structure of the organization can also be influenced by the 
inclusion of women. Women in many countries in the Middle East are marginalized or 
excluded from political structures, which subsequently encourages them to develop 
alternative models of organization.133 These alternative models of organization can be 
based on diverse forms of social organizations within society, a techinique employed by 
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the U.S. women’s movement in the early twentieth century.134 These diverse forms of 
organization also provide influence in a wider spectrum of institutions in society. As 
women mobilize, they provide access into these different segments of society. This 
organization and access can contribute to the resilience of a protest movement as well as 
the level of support it can amass. 
The diversity and skills that women contribute to social movements may also 
apply when social movements use online communication strategies. Studies of computer 
mediated communication reveal that there are differences between male-only, female-
only, and mixed-gender groups in terms of language choice, messaging patterns, and 
satisfaction with the computer-based interaction.135 While men used rougher language, 
and addressed the group collectively, women used more personal language, and engaged 
in more directed conversations; mixed gender group communication fell in between the 
single gender groups.136 Studies also indicate that individual communication styles 
changed depending on the group composition, with discussion groups adapting to the 
interaction patterns of the dominant gender within the group.137 Research shows that the 
gender composition of computer-based groups matters, shaping the interaction within the 
group, the satisfaction of the participations, and the timeliness of decisions.138 These 
studies indicate that gender can influence discourse in online communities and social 
movement organizations. If gender affects the diversity and innovation of a social 
movement, and group composition affects online discourse, it is likely that the diversity 
and innovation women contribute carries into social mobilization online. 
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D. GENDER AND THE CREATION OF GROUP IDENTITIES 
The creation of group identities requires establishing a unified set of values and 
meanings associated with a group narrative, essentially building consensus within a 
group.139 The more inclusive and resonant a collective identity is, the more support it 
may elicit internally, externally, and from potential movement recruits. Women focus on 
maintaining relationships and creating win-win scenarios, which can help create an 
inclusive group identity. Thus, women’s participation in social movements may add 
different dimensions to the dialogue that shapes the group identity compared to a 
movement dominated by a single gender. Furthermore, the strengths women contribute 
towards a group can influence group identity as it develops and evolves in online forums. 
Female emphasis on relationship building, negotiation, and discourse can help 
blend disparate sets of values into a single group identity.140 Research shows that while 
both genders can predict strategies for negotiation, women are often better at 
understanding verbal and non-verbal cues as well as understanding others’ points of 
view.141 This strength may help mixed-gendered groups navigate contentious issues and 
produce group identities that are inclusive and more readily accepted by members of the 
group. 
Female emphasis on relationship building may enable women in groups to effect 
collective values and concerns in order to address a wider array of issues and create a 
more inclusive group identity.142 These skills can have a positive effect on a social 
movement. As d’Estree and Babbitt note in their study people who build relationships in 
this manner: 
[They] develop networks that reach into groups with whom they need to 
form political coalitions to gain influence. They are more likely to have 
access to less distorted information about the other party’s needs and 
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intended actions; hence, they may also have invaluable opportunities to 
validate or invalidate political operating assumptions.143  
Research also indicates that women in leadership positions are more frequently 
concerned with the welfare of those they work with and keeping constructive 
relationships with them.144 Women’s participation can provide social movement groups 
with an increased capacity to foster relationships, create a unified set of values, and 
address a wider range of contentious issues. Thus, women’s participation can contribute 
to the establishment of a cohesive group identity that resonates with a more diverse 
population and garners more support. 
Digital networks can also reinforce group identities through the creation of 
narratives, and when women are involved in online networks, they can contribute to this 
process.145 As interactive media participation encourages activity, and that activity for 
one member constitutes participation for another, the participation of a diverse group of 
people can shape group identity through these interactions.146 If women are engaged in 
online discourse, it is possible that their predisposition for relationship building, their 
ability to empathize and see different viewpoints, and their preferences for win-win 
solutions in conflict are reflected online.147 In an online environment dominated by 
communication and language choice, the ability to engender support and gain the 
empathy of others may contribute to the successful establishment of a group identity. 
Further studies note that women demonstrate more personal, moderate, and supportive 
language whereas men used more commanding, less moderate language.148 Women may 
employ more moderated language and debate when they engage in social movements, 
which may contribute to the successful development and maintenance of collective  
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identity. When women participate in social movement discourse through social media, 
they the potential exists for them to add to the narrative, represent a diverse audience, and 
help frame collective identity. 
E. COMMUNICATION AND GENDER 
Communication enables movement organizations to disseminate their repertoires, 
control group narratives and identities, and organize and plan protest events. Research 
shows that men and women communicate differently. The combination of these different 
communication skills and methods may enhance the means of communicating 
repertoires, identities, and plans for collective action. While communication is a critical 
element to the success of social movements, effective communication is central for 
movements that employ online social media resources. If each gender has different 
strengths in communication that resonate with a wide spectrum of individuals, then 
incorporating women into a social movement strengthens the communication potential of 
the movement. 
Taken as a whole, research on gender differences identifies that men and women 
communicate in gender-specific ways that can shape collective discourse. Critical skills 
when communicating in groups and negotiating repertories, identities, and determining 
collective action include self-disclosure, empathy, and superior communication skills.149 
Other essential skills include the ability to identify solutions that benefit all and ensure 
group interaction respects everyone and facilitates contributions by everyone.150 Women 
also practice dialogue more than debate and argument, which may enable factions within 
a group to build connections and negotiate as opposed to merely maximizing their 
interests.151 Incorporating women into group conversation may facilitate a more inclusive 
dialogue, consolidate the messages of a group, and communicate it to a wider audience. 
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When women participate in social movements, their communication strengths 
play out when negotiating and gaining influence across different groups. Research shows 
that whereas men focus on positions during negotiations, women focus on relationships 
to determine what each faction’s goals are and address them more effectively.152 Women 
also develop networks and facilitate access into the organizations that they need to form 
coalitions.153 When women engage in social movements, research indicates that gender 
will affect social and political interactions and may influence interactions within groups 
and this may give women access to different or additional information.154 The 
incorporation of women in social movement discourse can contribute to building the 
relationships necessary for resilient activist networks. 
While social movements can benefit from the incorporation of women, the 
Internet offers women opportunities to capitalize on their communications strengths and 
share their opinions and experiences. It must be noted, however, that in the absence of 
non-verbal cues from face-to-face communication, women may find themselves at a 
disadvantage.155 Savicki hypothesizes, however, that women make up for the lack of 
visual cues from face-to-face communication by using language patterns and language 
choice.156 Boyer cites that a higher volume of messages were sent out in all-female or 
mixed gender groups, and notes that women’s incorporation into a decision-making 
process may influence the behavior of the group and drive more interaction within the 
group.157 In general, these studies indicate that women continue to send out more 
messages within a group and communicate more frequently. This behavior ensures that 
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communication continues between members of an organization, thus keeping dialogue 
over movement repertories, objectives, and actions in motion. 
F. LOWERED COSTS AND BARRIERS TO PROTEST 
The differences in male and female preferences for violence, negotiation 
strategies, and communication skills affects the development of trust networks that are 
essential to establishing cooperation and lowering costs of protest. My research indicates 
that when women engage in negotiations and group discussion, they can engender trust.  
Furthermore, studies of computer mediated communications show that not only does 
technology empower weaker groups, but also it may influence group cooperation.  
Studies show that women can positively influence contentious negotiations, that female 
compromises are viewed more favorably, and that female negotiators are viewed as more 
trustworthy.158 If the participation of women during group interactions contributes to the 
development of stronger trust networks among movement participants, then these trust 
networks may contribute to lowering barriers to protest. 
If women are seen as more trustworthy, men within the group may be more 
willing to compromise during discourse or share resources during interaction. Studies 
showed that members of a more powerful group are more willing to share scarce 
resources with subordinate groups who are viewed as cooperative and trustworthy.159 
Additional studies of group interaction found that there were few differences between 
women’s contributions to groups that were only women or predominantly male, but 
instead they found that men contributed more towards cooperating when interacting in 
groups that were predominantly female.160 Additionally, the incorporation of women into 
protest activity may signal to regime forces that a group presents less of a threat, thus, 
female participation in social movement groups may also lower barriers to protest by 
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increasing the capacity of a group to evade repression.161 These networks and this 
cooperation stand to create a higher level of trust and lower barriers to protest. 
While incorporating women into social movements can build trust networks and 
lower barriers to protest, the incorporation of women into online social movement 
communities may have a similar effect. The inclusion of women in social movements and 
organizations can increase the strength of trust networks and collaboration, studies of 
computer mediated communication stand to empower both stronger and weaker parties 
and create more win-win situations, thus enhancing trust networks and giving weaker 
parties a potentially stronger voice in group interaction.162 Online social networks 
provide women with the capacity to support social movements both physically and 
virtually, enabling participation by women when it would otherwise be prohibitive.163 
Thus, the capacity for women to create and sustain trust networks may contribute to 
lowering barriers to protest. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Social movements that employ online social networks as part of their organization 
require individuals to serve as orchestrators who can communicate ideas, create 
relationships, and lower the costs of participation.164 I argue that women, given their 
abilities and influence on group dynamics can serve as these network orchestrators in 
online social movement communities in the Middle East and contribute to the success of 
a social movement. Female negotiation and communication skills are essential in the 
unification of group messages and the coordination between various sub-groups of a 
movement. Women’s preferences for nonviolence and their negotiating strengths may 
encourage the employment of a nonviolent protest repertoire. The inclusion of women in 
a social movement contributes to the diversity of movement participants, which is also a 
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key element in successful protest movements.165 Furthermore, female differences and 
strengths in communication also may contribute to the effective creation and 
communication of a more unified group identity, further contributing to group success. 
Finally, the participation of women in a social movement may not only help achieve 
consensus and unify a group but may also lower the barriers to protest. By 
communicating the group message, women can fill a vital role as orchestrators in creating 
the unity, numbers, and trust networks required for the execution of widespread activism 
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III. INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES 
In January 2011, the Arab Spring protests swept through the Middle East, starting 
with Tunisia’s ouster of President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and thus signaling to 
opposition movements in other Arab countries that dramatic change was possible. Arab 
leaders maintained a watchful eye on the rising tide of protests in neighboring countries, 
simultaneously seeking to shore up domestic support and quell opposition forces in their 
own territories. These nationalist movements thrived on the streets and in the virtual 
world, with women playing a visible role in many of these Arab Spring protests. The 
uprisings in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain centered on old, long-standing grievances, 
employing new social media tools to help mobilize people and gain support. The 
movements in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain differ in their national histories, social 
structures, mobilization opportunities, and grievances, yet each movement saw women 
take to the streets and to the Internet to participate in the uprisings.  A few key points 
common to all three case studies, elucidated in the studies below are  
• Though traditional, grass roots mobilization was crucial to protests in each 
country, social media provided a new way to organize, mobilize, and 
report on the protests. 
• Women who participated in protests engaged and mobilized their own 
unique social networks and communicated to their associates, this 
provided opposition forces access to larger audience and more diverse 
knowledge and skills. 
• The capacity to employ social media in protest varies by society. In Egypt 
and Bahrain, women employed social media to participate in protest 
activity, whereas in Yemen, traditional methods of mobilization were 
more effective. 
In this chapter I first review the background of the three case studies, then discuss 
the employment of social media during each protest, women’s participation in each 
protest, and conclude with female contributions to the protests. 
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A. EGYPT  
We want to go down to Tahrir Square on January 25. If we still have 
honor and want to live with dignity on this land, we have to go down on 
January 25. We’ll go down and demand our rights, our fundamental 
human rights... If you think yourself a man, come with me on January 25th 
[Emphasis added].166  
Asmaa Mahfouz’s demand for dignity in her video blog resonated with the 
protesters that gathered in Tahrir Square in Cairo two days later in January 2011. The 
crowds throughout Egypt demanded “Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice,” and were 
exhausted from decades of a declining economy, rising unemployment, and heavy-
handed government repression.167 As protests slowly escalated in size and numbers, the 
June 6, 2010 death of Egyptian blogger Khaled Said symbolized the inability of the 
Egyptian government to protect its people, the corruption of the security forces, and 
created a profound sense of injustice among the well-connected technology-savvy 
Egyptian youth.168 
The elections of November 2010, widely viewed as fraudulent, convinced many 
of the need for political change creating another domestic opportunity for 
mobilization.169 Opposition parties spread word of the fraudulent electoral practices 
among their networks of activists.170 With the opposition groups engaged, protests 
ongoing, and grievances mounting, domestic opportunities for protest were rife. 
As tension in Egypt mounted, Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire in Tunisia 
in protest, igniting the Jasmine Revolution. Tunisia’s success in ousting President Zine 
el-Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011, combined with a lack of interference by Western 
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powers in the rising tide of protests, created international opportunities that convinced the 
Egyptian people a revolution could work.171 Tunisia’s success was the spark for Egypt’s 
revolution.172 Activists began to advertise January 25, 2011 as the “Day of Revolt” and 
spread the word through various online and offline social networks.173 
January 25, 2011 signaled the beginning of 18 days of protest throughout Egypt, 
paralyzing major cities, damaging the economy, and chipping away at the government’s 
legitimacy. The majority of these protests were nonviolent, with thousands of Egyptians 
gathering in Tahrir square.174 Recognizing the opposition’s use of social media, the 
Egyptian government blocked Twitter and Facebook on January 26; two days later all 
Internet and mobile phone services were suspended. On February 1, as Tahrir Square 
swelled with anywhere from 200,000 to two million protesters, President Mubarak 
offered a concession of not running for reelection, which was promptly ignored.175 The 
following day, security forces tried to clear Tahrir Square by force and failed. 176 The 
hard fought victory made Tahrir Square symbolic site of protest and indicated the 
potential for victory among the protestors. By February 10, President Mubarak 
announced that he was giving more power to the vice president, and a day later, the 
President resigned.177 On February 12, protestors cleaned up Tahrir Square, and by 
March 19, a constitutional referendum was held.178 
The uprisings in Egypt, while considered successful in achieving a power 
transition, were only the beginning of unrest and contentious collective action. By March 
23, the government outlawed strikes and protests, and by April 1, protestors were back in 
                                                 
171 International Crisis Group, “Egypt Victorious?,” i 
172 Ibid. 
173 Timeline synthesized from Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope, 53–56, 247–252; 
International Crisis Group, “Egypt Victorious?,” i–3. 
174 International Crisis Group, “Egypt Victorious?,” 3. 






Tahrir. Protests continued in response to the new government and armed forces 
throughout the rest of 2011. These protests not only demonstrated to the Egyptian people 
that change was possible, they also cemented new tactics for the employment of social 
media and new roles for women within the protests. 
B. YEMEN 
On 14 April, President Saleh declared that Islam forbids men and women 
mixing in public places and called on women to ‘return home.’ The next 
day, across the country, thousands of women took to the streets to affirm 
their rights to peaceful assembly and to participate in public life. 
[Emphasis added]179 
Much like the Egyptians, the Yemeni people faced mounting economic 
challenges, political exclusion, and regime repression. In the two decades preceding the 
2011 revolution, Yemen faced increasing challenges from the Huthi rebellion in North 
Yemen, the secessionist movement in southern Yemen, terrorist threats from Al-Qaeda, 
and internal political unrest connected to electoral and legislative reforms.180 At the time 
of the protests Yemen was plagued with extensive poverty: around 43 percent of the 
Yemeni population was below the poverty line and unemployment was approximately 35 
percent, with nearly half of all 18 to 28 year olds unemployed.181 While Yemen had a 
comparatively open political system, President Saleh maintained his hold on power 
through an intricate series of patronage networks along both tribal and geographical 
lines.182 Grievances with the lack of political opportunities grew when the Yemeni 
Parliament’s leading party expressed plans to remove restrictions on term limits for the 
president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, enabling him to remain in office indefinitely.183 Adding to 
these profound economic and political grievances, extensive violent repression from 
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regime security forces and regime-hired thugs demonstrated to opposition parties that the 
regime could not protect their rights to protest peacefully, thus deepening the sense of 
injustice among Yemeni citizens.184 
While discontent and opposition to the Saleh regime grew, patronage networks, 
tribal loyalties, and Islamist agendas all hampered the creation of a unified opposition.  
The Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) or Common Forum incorporated five parties, including 
the Islamist Islah party and the southern Yemeni Socialist party.185 Given Saleh’s “divide 
and conquer” strategy to gain tribal loyalties and maintain patronage networks, and the 
lack of a legitimate political challenger, the JMP was the organized opposition party as 
the protests began.186 Student activists, however, were first to organize, mobilize, and 
protest with the JMP following.187 Initially, opposition demands focused on the more 
political opportunities, less corruption, as well as political transparency and 
accountability.188 These demands expanded as Yemenis saw the success of opposition 
forces other Arab countries and began to imagine their own successful revolution. “Irhal” 
or “Go” became a slogan in major cities such as Taiz, representing the youth opposition’s 
demand to see President Saleh ousted.189 
On January 20, 2011, three major rallies took place in Sana’a, Taiz, and Al-
Baydah demanding the reengagement of national dialogue, the return of presidential term 
limits, and protesting poor living conditions.190 Three days later, before the Egyptian 
revolution began en masse, a new wave of protests against President Saleh began.191 As 
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Cairo’s Tahrir Square filled with people, the rallies in Sana’a also mobilized thousands of 
demonstrators.192 On February 2, recognizing the emerging threat of these protests, 
President Saleh offered concessions to opposition forces that included resuming the 
national dialogue, increased voting rights for youth, and to redact his pursuit of a second 
term and reinstate term limits.193 These concessions were viewed with suspicion by 
opposition forces and ultimately refused.194 
As Egypt’s president fell, demonstrations grew to tens of thousands of people in 
eight cities in Yemen following Friday prayers on February 18. President Saleh relied 
heavily on support from tribes and Islamists to secure his power and attempted to retain 
their support and the support of Islamist scholars through meetings, patronage networks, 
and exacerbating social divisions.195 Saleh’s tenuous power base held strong and political 
opposition parties, tribal leaders, and religious leadership shied away from the protests 
until mid-February when the numbers of protestors swelled and regime repression 
became violent.196 On February 23, members of parliament began to defect and days 
later, anti-regime demonstrations swelled to record numbers.197 Tens of thousands 
gathered in Sana’a at the renamed “Change Square” to demand immediate regime 
change, and protests in Aden and Taiz were even larger. Activists from civil society and 
youth from student organizations led many of these protests.198 Reporting on the protests 
in Change Square in Sana’a estimate the protesters comprised about 50 percent 
tribesmen, 40 percent students, 10percent Huthis and others.199 By late February 2011, 
anti-regime protests became a fixture in cities throughout Yemen.  
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With Saleh’s hold on power threatened, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries began to withdraw support, giving opposition forces an international 
opportunity to continue their demonstrations.200 As opposition grew in size and violence, 
the GCC countries provided President Saleh with proposal for his departure from power, 
which he rejected.201 President Saleh’s dogged hold on power was disrupted on June 3, 
2011 when Saleh sought medical treatment in Saudi Arabia after an assassination 
attempt.202 He remained in Saudi Arabia after his release from the hospital on August 
7.203 Six weeks later, President Saleh returned to Yemen, which prompted a rise in 
protest violence resulting in hundreds of deaths.204 As protests continued, Saudi Arabia 
negotiated an agreement to guarantee Saleh’s resignation in November 2011.205  
Finally, President Saleh, in exchange for immunity, agreed to leave office on 
November 23, 2011.206 Yemen’s protesters finally accomplished one of their goals. 
Following Saleh’s departure, the Vice President al-Hadi assumed the presidency, and the 
National Reconciliation Government began charting Yemen’s path forward.207  
C. BAHRAIN 
My father, Ebrahim Sharif, of the National Democratic Action Society, 
had been arrested in the middle of the night. I ask her [my mother] to tell 
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account of the arrest in English to post it on my Twitter account. Back 
then I had about 150 followers. It jumped to over 1,000 in just a few days 
[Emphasis added].208   
While Bahrain’s opposition forces were inspired by events in Tunisia and Egypt, 
the Bahraini revolution was far from successful. Unlike Egypt and Yemen before the 
Arab Spring, Bahraini citizens enjoyed a relatively prosperous economy, considerable 
access to modern communications infrastructure, and a moderately open society.209 The 
predominant source of grievances among the Bahraini opposition groups focused on the 
discrimination of the majority—Shiite population by the Sunni al-Khalifa regime, the 
lack of opportunities for political participation for everyone outside the regime, and 
severe regime repression and human rights violations.210 Longstanding Shiite 
discrimination produced a strong sense of injustice due to inequitable opportunities for 
political participation and employment.211 The longstanding grievances over promised 
political reform were a decade in the making. A year after Bahrainis overwhelmingly 
approved a referendum, Bahrain’s emir singularly promoted a revised constitution that 
both ensured the regime’s primacy and neglected opposition parties’ concerns.212 
Following events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, Bahrain’s opposition parties 
called for protests on February 14, 2011 in Manama.213 Over the next four days, after 
violent regime repression employing tear gas and live ammunition, protesters took 
control of Pearl Square and 18 Shiite opposition leaders from the al-Wifaq party resigned 
from parliament in protest.214 During this time, the protests grew as Shiite leaders called 
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for their constituents to support the “14 February Movement.”215 The brutal use of force 
by Bahraini forces further outraged and mobilized even more of the population.216 At the 
peak of the protests, it is estimated that almost half of the country’s population mobilized 
and protested on the streets.217 Despite growing support, the unity among opposition 
parties suffered from debates between formal movement leadership and highly regarded 
street activists over whether to negotiate with the regime.218 
The al-Khalifa regime attempted negotiations with opposition forces, including 
the leading Shiite organizations, opposition demands, however, could not be met.219 
Saudi Arabia’s intervention on March 14 enabled Bahrain to redirect its forces the 
following day and violently remove the protestors from Pearl Square.220 During this 
crackdown, regime forces demolished the Pearl Roundabout, a symbol of resistance 
adopted and occupied by protesters.221 In addition to clearing the square and demolishing 
symbols of protest, security forces in Bahrain detained, arrested, and removed protesters 
and opposition leaders throughout segments of society.222 The monarchy in Bahrain also 
employed a series of nonviolent tactics, including payoffs, secret meetings to discuss 
possible reforms, and its own use of social media to flood the information domain with 
messages disparaging the activists.223 Saudi Arabia’s involvement provided support to 
the regime as well as support in the information arena.224 In many ways, the protests in 
Bahrain highlighted new uses of social media and news media by activists to promote 
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their causes, by regimes to send a counter message, and by state-influenced regional 
media to eliminate broadcasts of protests entirely.225 
Egyptians, Yemenis, and Bahrainis gathered in their cities and towns in protest 
during the Arab Spring over similar grievances, facing different levels of regime 
repression, and achieving different levels of success. While Egyptians and Yemenis faced 
significant economic hardships and the Bahraini citizens were economically more 
prosperous, the profound sense of injustice resulting from regimes no longer protecting 
their citizens or respecting human dignity was rampant. Each country faced strong social 
divisions between religious sects, tribes, or various opposition movements. Despite these 
divisions, each country also witnessed young, disaffected student activists corroborated 
with well-organized opposition parties to draw protesters from many corners of society. 
Various forms of regime repression also marked each country, Egypt’s protestors faced 
marginal repression compared to the live ammunition fired by Yemeni forces, and the 
extreme violence waged by Bahrain’s security forces. Despite differences in grievances, 
mobilization, and repression, the protests in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain were influenced 
by new applications of social media and women protesters on the streets and on the web. 
D. SOCIAL MEDIA: THE REVOLUTIONARY’S MEGAPHONE 
One of the most talked-about features of the Arab Spring was the use of social 
media as a tool for coordination between activists and communication to the outside 
world. Yet the data questions the importance of social media to activism, stressing the 
primacy of traditional organization and mobilization. Polls estimate 80 percent of 
Egyptians owned a cell phone in 2010, and Facebook had nearly 5 million users in the 
Arab world by the time protestors gathered in Tahrir.226 By contrast, Yemen ranks 
exceptionally low in terms of education and computer use. In December 2010, less than 
10 percent of Yemenis had Internet access, and less than 0.75 percent of Yemenis used 
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Facebook.227 The youth, who represent over 60 percent of the Yemeni population, are the 
predominant Internet users in Yemen.228 While limited in access to social media, Yemeni 
youth activists used Facebook and online forums to connect geographically disparate 
groups, coordinate protest plans and repertoires, and debate ideas.229 Bahrain, given the 
considerable wealth and education of its population, had extensive mobile phone and 
Internet access and a well-developed community of social media activists.230 Bahraini 
activists however, the opposition with the most technologically connected populations to 
engage, experienced far less success during the Arab Spring than their counterparts in 
Egypt and Yemen. 
1. Years of Practice 
Each country entered the Arab Spring with its own virtual and physical histories 
of activism and mobilization. Yemeni civil society, with its exceptionally low Internet 
connectivity, relied heavily on traditional forms of public gatherings and forums for 
discussion, organization, and mobilization such as “Qat chews.”231 While opportunities 
to employ social media to mobilize wide groups of people were limited in Yemen, 
activists nonetheless saw opportunities to use social media to connect disparate 
communities of people through other online activists. 
Egyptian and Bahraini activists, by contrast, had practice employing social media 
to organize and mobilize. The Egyptian Kifaya movement in 2005 took advantage of new 
communications technology and coordinated their efforts via the Internet. This 
combination of nonviolent protest and new technology continued in Egypt and was used 
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by the April 6 youth movement, who first employed Facebook to and encouraged 
protestors to strike in 2008.232 The “We are All Khaled Said” Facebook group formed in 
July 2010 and used social media tools to coordinate and conduct peaceful demonstrations 
that expanded in size and organization.233 The April 6 youth movement also coordinated 
activities online and adapted their tactics to circumvent government repression employing 
advice from other movements that avoided Internet monitoring.234 These practices 
enabled the opposition leadership to coordinate activities without being detained or 
repressed by security forces.235 Online networks also linked other networks to protest 
movements, including soccer fans and Tunisian protestors, which added to the numbers 
of protestors and enabled the diffusion of tactics.236 As opposition activities accelerated, 
the National Coalition for Change used social media to promote the success of the 
Tunisia revolution and promote the political opportunity to protest.237 Social media was 
used in advance of the Egyptian uprisings as a free space for activists to coordinate 
efforts, generate consensus on issues, gain support, and educate protestors. As the Arab 
Spring approached, Egypt’s opposition forces had enough practice employing social 
media and modern communications technology to stay ahead of government repressive 
forces. 
Much like Egypt, Bahrain’s networked community of online activists spent years 
employing social media such as blogs and Internet forums to support mobilization. 
Despite regime repression, Bahrain’s online forums transformed into, “fully engaged 
public spheres where Bahrainis openly discussed human rights and broader politics” 
expressing grievances that applied to all of Bahrain’s citizens, and not just the Shia 
communities.238 Bahrain’s extensive blogosphere united both Shi’a and Sunni bloggers 
                                                 
232  Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 214. 
233  International Crisis Group, “Egypt Victorious?,” 1. 
234  Ibid., 9. 
235  Ibid.  
236  Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope, 55. 
237  Ibid., 11. 
238 Lynch, The Arab Uprising, 109–110. 
 55 
and formed a new level of interconnectivity. Opposition members coordinated both on 
and offline and had access to a growing number of resources and debates.239 In the years 
leading up to protests in Bahrain, the community of online activists grew and many 
bloggers began to meet to discuss issues regularly at the Crown Plaza Hotel in 
Manama.240 These public gatherings moved virtual debates into the real world, 
potentially strengthening ties between activists, creating a sense of solidarity, and 
lowering barriers to protest. As connectivity expanded through urban areas and villages, 
Internet forums such as Bahrain Online evolved to an open forum for opposition parties 
to organize, coordinate protests and collective action, and critique both local and national 
issues.241 Unlike Egypt and Yemen, however, the Bahraini regime recognized the 
potential threat posed by these activists and worked to silence opposition voices and 
provide a counter narrative.242 
Although social media tools had varying reach and influence in each country, they 
connected activists and facilitated social movement planning, discourse, and 
communication. Social media and Web 2.0 technologies can be used to encourage civic 
participation and engagement, provide spaces for free speeches, encourage political 
networking, create associational space, and enable activists to coordinate and execute 
protests.243 As activists mobilized during the Arab Spring the virtual world evolved as a 
space for discourse and communication. Initial planning was conducted in one-to-one 
forums, such as short message service (SMS) (i.e. texting, or Google’s “GChat” instead 
of broadcast social media programs), as decisions were made other social media 
programs such as Twitter or Facebook were employed to broadcast information to 
various organizations.244 The comprehensive layers of social media used to coordinate in 
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small groups, avoid regime repression, and broadcast decisions and guidance to a wide 
audience all formed part of successful social media strategies during the Arab Spring. 
2. #Mobilization 
As the Arab Spring protests evolved, activists used social media to promote the 
demonstrations, coordinate mobilization, avoid repression, and delegitimize government 
actions. Facebook served as a planning space, Twitter and SMS facilitated 
communication among activists before and during protests, and YouTube was used to 
communicate the protests to regional and international media.245 
In Egypt, Facebook posts from opposition movements communicated protest 
repertoires and guidance and provided tactics, slogans, and recommendations for protest 
safety.246 In addition to Facebook postings and YouTube videos, maps were posted 
online to show protesters where to avoid police and repressive forces, thus keeping them 
safe and avoiding confrontations.247 Twitter communicated repertoires for marches, 
protests, and even served as a means to distribute coordinating instructions to enable 
more people to participate or show support. In one example, a link for a document on 
Google Drive was sent out via Twitter prior to the protest. This document contained 
information on grievances, slogans and chants, items to bring, phone numbers to call in 
the event of injury or arrest, and contact information for the leaders of each protest march 
in the city.248 The diverse employment of social media, the quality of the message, and 
the quantity of networks the messages reached helped the demonstrations gain strength 
and support in Egypt. 
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For Yemeni activists, social media not only linked activists but also provided new 
protestors with means to circumvent formal politics and associated power structures. 
State institutions, formal political parties, and private organizations controlled Yemeni 
media, this leaves little room for emerging activists to be heard.249 Social media provided 
a way for activists to connect as well as circumvent state controlled media and gain a 
share of the opposition voice without having to join the JMP or other formal 
organizations.250 Student activists at Change Square in Sana’a used Facebook, blogs, and 
YouTube channels to share news, photographs, and videos with local, regional, and 
international media.251 Even today, activists continue to use social media as a means of 
citizen journalism and a way to document human rights violations.252 While social media 
did not play as visible of a role in Yemen as it did during the Egyptian revolution, it 
performed similar functions, allowing opposition forces to organize, coordinate, and 
share news of the protests with the world. 
Many of the emerging youth activists in Bahrain employed social media to bypass 
formal opposition groups as well. In February 2011, two youth groups issued online 
statements and communiqués that further reflected a lack of unity among protesters. The 
first group, the “Youth of the 14 February Revolution” issued demands for complete 
regime removal and democratic transition, whereas “The Bahrain 14 February Peaceful 
Movement” promoted a constitutional monarchy and democratic reforms.253 Another 
opposition group, the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights and some of its 
contemporaries employed social media tools as a way to convey information to protestors 
as well as the international community.254 Among activists in each country social media 
was employed to coordinate, communicate repertoires, and express their grievances. 
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3. Repression  
Social media played a significant role in providing a narrative of the protests to 
regional and international media, countering state sponsored media, and documenting 
regime repression. Activist videos were uploaded near-real time onto the Internet and 
picked up by satellite television and news stations, which made sharing views and 
developing a collective identity easier, lowered barriers to protest, and educated a wide 
audience about the protests.255 The application of social media to reveal government 
repression and regime-led violence against nonviolent protesters mobilized more 
individuals who were outraged at the regime’s injustice. 
In Egypt, the government ordered an Internet blackout to halt the opposition’s use 
of social media. Not only did this blackout drive more protestors into the streets in anger, 
it also led to activists using more creative means of sharing information such as File 
Transfer Protocol (FTP), landlines, and dial-up modems.256 Activists also worked 
through sympathetic Internet-savvy activist networks in other countries, and Google and 
Twitter developed “Speak 2 Tweet” to allow protestors to continue sharing their 
experiences through their cell phones.257 Not only was the Internet disruption ineffective, 
it may have cost more than 90 million dollars in revenue for Egypt during the five-day 
blackout.258 As Castells notes, “Once a social movement has reached a certain threshold 
of size and impact, closing the Internet is neither possible nor effective.”259 
In addition to state blackouts, opposition movements employed social media to 
counter state sponsored media and pro-regime messaging, posting photographs of regime 
brutality.260 Bahrain’s activists employed social media to communicate messages that 
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contradicted the regime propaganda, while the regime claimed the protestors were an 
Iranian “fifth column,” the activists communicated messages of nationalism, unity, and 
peaceful protest to the world.261 Bahrain’s social media landscape became contentious 
territory between the protesters and the regime. 
Throughout the protests, social media was perceived as faster than spreading 
leaflets, but the necessity of physical mobilization was not ignored.262 Organizers such as 
Wael Ghonim stressed to members of their online constituency that they needed to spread 
the word and get others mobilized and out on the streets.263 Social media enabled 
opposition movements to coordinate outside the watchful eye of the government, 
provided a means to communicate information to a wide range of activists and networks 
and develop shared grievances, identities, and protest agendas. As people mobilized, 
social media provided a way to communicate protest details to a wide audience and 
quickly create a level of cohesion among a large group. The new media also helped to 
delegitimize governments, report regime repression, incite anger against government 
repressive measures, and gain the attention of the international community through news 
media. 
E. WOMEN: ON THE STREETS AND ON THE WEB 
Women, a group largely perceived as marginalized in Middle Eastern cultures and 
societies, firmly established a presence both on the streets and in online social media sites 
and virtual social movement networks that were traditionally considered public and 
masculine spaces.264 However, despite their online presence, the 2011 Arab Social Media 
Report identifies a “gender gap” in cyberspace due to lower numbers of female Internet 
use than the global average.265 The differences between the number of women and men 
on the Internet primarily attributed to social and cultural factors, rather than Internet 
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access or education opportunities. Regional opinion polls cite the two biggest reasons 
people view as the cause of the gender gap include social and cultural barriers and 
privacy concerns; national opinion polls reflect a similar trend with an even greater focus 
on societal/cultural limitations.266 While women faced significant challenges to virtual 
and physical activism, they were, nonetheless leaders, organizers, and participants during 
the Arab Spring protests. 
Women in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain had a unique history of participation in 
civil society and collective action that informed their participation in the Arab Spring 
protests. Women in Egypt have a history of cyberactivism, citizen journalism, and social 
mobilization. Activist women such as Esraa Abdel Fattah, a founder of the April 6 youth 
movement, coordinated protests both on and offline in the mid-2000s, while women 
journalists like Mona Eltahawy and Nora Younis reported and relayed events.267 The 
history of activism and participation afforded these women legitimacy and credibility 
before the uprisings started, which made them valuable sources of information as the 
protests began.268 At the height of the protests in Tahrir square it is estimated that almost 
25 percent of the million protestors were women.269 
Women were also highly visible participants in many of the protests in Yemen 
due to a history of female-led charitable and religious associations that enabled female 
protest organizers to leverage a complex network of social ties. The separation of Yemeni 
women from men, to include private Nadawat gatherings and female-only organizations 
enabled women to lay the groundwork and create the networks necessary for high risk  
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mobilization.270 This history of women’s organizations produced a generation of female 
leaders that were connected to multiple civil society organizations, well organized, and 
capable of mass mobilization. 
Among the women who organized protests, the most prominent is Tawakkol 
Karman, the first Arab woman to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Karman organized 
weekly protests in Sana’a from 2007 through 2011, as well as student protests calling for 
the removal of President Saleh’s regime.271 Her leadership role in the Yemeni revolution 
evolved through years of engagement in various realms of Yemeni civil society and 
activist groups. Her ability to network across multiple organizations as well as years of 
experience organizing protests contributed to the successful mobilization of Yemeni 
women.272 Islamic charities and societies provide Yemeni women with opportunities to 
participate politically, religiously, and civically in Yemeni life; they develop informal 
links to multiple organizations focused on charity, welfare, religion, and education as 
they execute their tasks and provide services.273 Women participating in the Islah 
Charitable Society, Nadawat gatherings, the Hizb al-Islah, or other civic organizations 
frequently have social ties to other groups and organizations that they maintain in the 
conduct of their charitable work, these dense networks of cross cutting cleavages provide 
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secular women including Bushra al-Maqtari, Awra Uthman, and Amal al-Bahsha, led 
protests in Taiz and other cities.275 Women, secular and conservative, mobilized across 
Yemen during the spring of 2011.  
Many Bahraini women also took to the Internet and the streets in protest during 
the Arab Spring. Women like Maryam and Zeinab al-Khawaja, blogger Lamees Dhaif, 
and Facebook user Ayat al-Gomezi used social media to speak out against the regime and 
document arrests and human rights abuses.276 Many of these women were harassed, 
arrested, or had their families threatened by security forces due to their Internet 
activity.277 During the protests, female doctors and nurses helped treat people injured by 
security forces, often at the risk of being detained and arrested.278 Women in Bahrain 
mobilized alongside men, virtually and physically, and were arrested, tortured, and 
harassed alongside their male counterparts. 
Interviews, photos, Twitter, and blog postings reflected a new generation of 
female activists who were equally willing to take to the streets and to the web. News 
reports, journal articles, and studies provide evidence that women used social media to 
contribute to the success of these protest movements. Female involvement in the 
planning, discourse, and execution of these protests, both online and offline, contributed 
to the successful mobilization of millions of people across the Middle East in early 2011. 
1. Gender and Nonviolent Protest  
Women’s leadership roles as organizers of protests influenced the selection of 
protest repertoires, to include nonviolent protest tactics. As protest leader Tawakkol 
Karman stated in an interview with Al-Jazeera, “Taking to the streets in peaceful protests 
is the only way. I learned about anti-violent struggle from reading and I owe my passion 
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for peace to Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King.”279 As part of 
the nonviolent repertoire in Yemen, pink was chosen as a color to symbolize the 
revolution and set the tone for peaceful protests.280 The prominence of Yemeni women in 
organizing and leading protests may have contributed to the use of nonviolent protest 
repertoires. 
Egyptian Asmaa Mahfouz’s video blog called for Egyptians to come to the streets 
and occupy Tahrir, but did not call for violence; this call was reinforced with nonviolent 
protest instructions distributed over social media.281 In Bahrain, some of the earliest 
protest footage featured Zeinab al-Khawaja peacefully protesting in the middle of a 
traffic roundabout and being forcibly removed by security officers.282 The capacity for 
women to influence the protest repertoire choices and demonstrate peacefully not only 
encouraged nonviolent protests, but also delivered a more inclusive protest narrative to 
the international community. 
2. Contributions to Diversity and Innovation 
Women who employed social media diversified their communication tactics, 
linking blogs to Twitter accounts, posting links on Twitter accounts to photo and video 
dumps, and providing Facebook and blog links within their own blogs. In Egypt, Mona 
Seif, used her blog to post the demands of the protestors prior to the protests, share 
protest petitions, and detail her personal experiences participating in the protests through 
pictures and words.283 She continued to relay protest experiences and testimonies of 
individuals who were beaten or arrested by the police.284 Her employment of personal 
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experience and street reporting evoked both sense of injustice and humanized the protest 
stories. She linked her blog entries to her Twitter account (@monasosh), and thus 
broadcast her messages to her followers on Twitter, who then Retweeted her accounts. In 
addition to providing links to her blogs on Twitter, she also provided links to her Flickr 
account, where she posted photos of the protests from her participation, which were also 
Retweeted.285 Journalist and Twitter user, Zeinobia’s Twitter posts and blog entries are in 
English, thus reaching a wider audience. Her reporting and activism, complete with 
pictures, Flickr photo uploads, videos, polls, and links into worldwide blogs, connect her 
online activism as well as her followers to an international community, garnering 
international attention to opposition movements within borders of Egypt.286 Egyptian 
women engaged their audiences through innovative and diverse applications of social 
media. 
Yemeni women, while not as prolific as Egyptian women online, demonstrated 
diversity and innovation through their participation in civil society. Other protest 
organizers, such as Bushra al-Maqtari and Awra Uthman employed blogs and Facebook 
posts to communicate issues to the outside world.287 While social media was not as 
prevalent in Yemen as it was in other Arab Spring countries, activists still employed a 
wide range of social media to communicate Yemen’s revolution, thus contributing  to the 
diversity of the protests. 
3. Collective Identity 
Female demonstrators mobilized with visible markers of a nationalist collective 
identity. Pictures of women wearing both secular and Islamic dress in all countries with 
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national colors, painted flags, and other symbols of nationalist pride portray their status 
as citizens of a nation.288 Whether participants or leaders of protests, women who 
selected national symbols and colors as part of their protest repertoire reinforced their 
nationalist identity and their right to protest alongside their fellow citizens. The use of 
national identity as a unifying group identity increased the potential population of 
protesters by incorporating members of various religious sects, tribes, and civil 
organizations, and the women who were associated with each. 
4. Communication 
One area where women in the Arab Spring enhanced the protests was through 
their communication of events on social media networks. Women employed various 
social networks to restate movement demands, detail the events of a protest, and provide 
reports and pictures following protest events. In Egypt, prior to events, women used 
social media to restate the goals of the protests to their audiences, both domestic and 
international. Hadota, an Egyptian woman used social media to spread news of the 
protests through Twitter and also employed her blog to consolidate the demands of 
bloggers and spread a petition demanding the investigation of the Minister of 
Information.289 Zeinab Samir frequently marked her Tweets with the Hashtag “#25Jan” 
and also used her blog to reiterate the demands of the protestors and provided links to 
Facebook pages with these demands, thus linking her social media network to a wider 
community of activists.290  
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During the Arab Spring protests, women used social media to engage a wider 
audience than they would otherwise have access to. Mona Eltahawy, an Egyptian 
journalist in New York during the uprisings translated Egyptian events, connecting 
English and Arabic followers and reporting on the events of the uprising.291 In Yemen, 
videos were posted via Facebook and Blog sites and retransmitted by cyberactivists over 
satellite television channels.292 This enabled Yemenis, and isolated Yemeni women in 
particular, to see the revolution as it happened and mobilize a wider audience.293 The 
capacity to communicate Yemen’s revolution both internationally and domestically was 
an important factor in sustaining widespread mobilization. 
Social media activists in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain understood the magnifying 
power of social media. Lamees Dhaif blogged and Tweeted about Bahrain’s protests to 
an audience that was between four and five times larger than Bahrain’s newspaper 
audience.294  Human rights activists, such as Zeinab and Maryam al-Khawaja employed 
Twitter as a method to communicate their ideas and document human rights violations by 
regime security forces.295 These female activists understood their messages were 
circumventing regime censorship, reaching a wider audience, and reaching an audience 
that could not be repressed by security forces in Bahrain. Protesters in Bahrain also had a 
history of using “Moblogs,” communicating what activist on the street with a mobile 
phone reported to a blogger who could continually provide updates via blog posts.296 In 
these examples, and many others, women employed social media to communicate events 
as they were happening detail their personal experiences. 
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5. Lowering Barriers to Protest 
Women faced a variety of threats from both virtual and physical mobilization 
during the Arab Spring that formed barriers to protest. In addition to ever-present threats 
of sexual assault and regime repression, many female activists faced slander, defamation, 
and even imprisonment.  Social media was used as a way to circumvent many physical 
threats, reinforce a sense of “safety in numbers” and virtue, and contradict regime 
repression.  
During the 18 days of protest in Egypt, there were very few reported assaults 
against women in Tahrir Square; this was a decrease in reported assaults from prior to the 
protests.297 Women remained in the square alongside men, regardless of curfews or 
social norms as leaders, organizers, and protesters.298 In some cases, women mobilized 
with other female relatives and friends, drawing more women to protest and creating a 
sense of “safety in numbers.”299 Women also served as guards to conduct security checks 
on other women entering Tahrir square, thus enabling women to enter the protests 
without being subject to a physical search by men and further lowering a social barrier to 
protest.300 
Social media was also used to provide advice on safety to the protesters, offering 
specific instructions for women in order to avoid sexual assault.301 Physical mobilization 
is not without risk: In Egyptian protests following the Tahrir square uprising, the military  
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attacked women, imposed virginity checks, or simply stood aside while assaults took 
place.302 With safety concerns such as these, the Internet offers a relative safe-haven for 
female participation in protest activity. 
Much like the protesters in Egypt, Yemeni women faced significant barriers to 
protest including the threat of violence and the challenges of household obligations.  
While Yemeni women found themselves assaulted by security forces, others faced 
slander and scathing public criticism.303 Additionally, female associational life in Yemen 
provided protesters with an extensive network of family members and friends to assist 
with household obligations and childcare, thus making participation in protest 
movements easier for some women.304 
Regime repression, including the threat of violence and arrests formed another 
barrier to protest. Bahraini activists, both male and female, face significant jail time for 
their activities. During the protests, many who mobilized were subject to brutal 
repression from regime security forces. Following the protests, security forces 
investigated, harassed, and detained many of the protesters to include teachers, doctors 
who treated the injured, and social media activists.305 Many of these activists remain in 
detention, and subsequently employ social media to communicate with the outside world 
about their treatment.306 Free activists, in the meanwhile, use networked organizations 
such as the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, as well as their Twitter and Facebook 
accounts to campaign for the release of fellow activists.307 In recent years, many female 
activists have emerged to take the place of fathers, husbands, or other male relatives who 
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remain detained by Bahrain’s government.308 The use of social media use to educate, 
inform, and enhance the safety of mobilizing women helped lower barriers to physical 
protest while also providing women who were unable to mobilize with an alternate venue 
to demonstrate support for the protests.309 
F. CONCLUSION 
Women in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain mobilized in significant numbers both 
online and offline in the early months of the Arab Spring in 2011. Each protest faced 
similar grievances, yet struggled through different challenges to protest unity, and faced 
varying levels of regime repression. The combination of these issues, as well as 
mobilization opportunities and structures, shaped the outcome of each protest. Other 
factors, such as levels of violence, diversity and innovation, group identities, 
communication, and barriers to protest influenced the demographics of the mobilized 
population as well as the narrative of the protests. In many protests, women were leaders, 
organizers, social media activists, and took to the streets alongside their countrymen.  
Evidence suggests that women contributed to many aspects of the protests through social 
media, most notably the diversity and innovation of the protests and the communication 
of protest information and repertoires. The next chapter will explore female influence 
within the online protest communities to determine how quantifiable that influence may 
be. 
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IV. DATA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Women in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain played a noteworthy role in the Arab 
Spring protests both on the streets and in the virtual world. As virtual networks were used 
to plan, coordinate, and report on protest activity, analysis of online social networks may 
provide insights on the differential impact of female participation. Twitter, an online 
micro blogging program, was selected for investigation because opposition movements 
used the program during the Arab Spring and Twitter data is publicly available. 
Twitter networks are distributed networks of directed communications, where one 
user broadcasts messages that can be viewed by their followers as well as users following 
a topic of interest.310 These networks are unlimited in their size and considered scale-
free, whereby a small group of users can create a majority of the communications.311 
Each communication, or “Tweet” is listed as an update that a user’s followers or friends 
can see.312 These updates consist of 140 characters that incorporate messages, content, or 
links that are broadcast to the user’s followers, directed to users in conversation, or 
directed to users by mentioning the user name in the post.313 Twitter networks are 
asymmetric as not every individual communicating with another user receives a 
communication in return (examples include spamming or group messages).  
The data set analyzed is a one-time, full Tweet retrieval of protest-centric Tweets 
originating from Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain from January 23 to February 22, 2011. 
Once the data was structured, each data set was imported into software programs used for 
visualizing social networks and computing measurements of influence for individuals and 
groups within social networks. The predominant Twitter users were identified in each 
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data set through degree centrality scores indicating high volumes of messages sent from, 
or received by, each user. The identified user’s profiles were queried through the Twitter 
search function to identify gender and location.314 
Network influence was assessed using centrality scores that provide a “rough 
indication” of an actor’s power based on its position relative to the other actors in a 
network.315 In terms of the Twitter data set, centrality scores provide an indication of 
each Twitter user’s position and influence compared to the other Twitter users. The 
Twitter data forms an asymmetric, directed network representing communication 
patterns. As Twitter networks may not reflect a network of strong social ties, the 
centrality scores serve as only a partial indicator of influence. To provide additional 
indicators of potential influence, other factors such as number of contacts, Tweets, 
Retweets, and growth of friends and followers. These patterns along with influence 
scores were compared to determine the differential impact of women within this Arab 
Spring Twitter data set. 
1. Key Findings 
• The following key findings resulted from analysis of the data set: 
• Egypt and Bahrain both presented protest-related Twitter data while 
Yemen had a very small protest-related Twitter network, indicating that 
Yemeni protestors relied more on traditional forms of mobilization and 
activism. 
• In both Egypt and Bahrain, women followed over four times more user 
accounts on their Twitter feeds than men, giving women access to 
information from more diverse sources. 
• In Egypt, women were nearly equally represented in the top fifty users of 
with the most connections in the data set. These women communicated 
more frequently, communicated to a wider range of users, and  
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communicated out to others more frequently than the influential men. Men 
in Egypt received more communications from others as opposed to 
sending communications. 
• In Bahrain, women were sparsely represented in the top fifty users with 
the most connections and communicated less than their male counterparts. 
Like they Egyptian women, they were more likely to communicate out to 
another account than to receive a communication. 
2. Twitter Data 
The data set was acquired from Topsy Labs, Inc., a social media data and analysis 
company, consisting of 131,512 individual Tweets selected based upon date, protest-
Hashtag, and location data. The data represents a sample of Tweets collected and 
identified as originating in Egypt, Yemen, or Bahrain from January 23, 2011 until 
February 22, 2011 using at least one of the identified protest-related Hashtags.316 Once 
processed, the data comprised 15,756 nodes, or individual user accounts, and 59,271 
links or connections between those user accounts. The individuals selected for analysis 
based on centrality are identified as being located in the country of interest. 
B. EGYPT 
The data set for Egypt is comprised of Tweets issued from January 23, 2011 to 
February 23, 2013, marked with any of the protest Hashtags, and geoinferenced to 
locations within Egypt.317 This data includes 73,815 Tweets sent between 11,969 unique 
nodes with 39,517 links between the nodes. Once users of interest were identified, this 
data analyzed included 10 men and 10 women who produced 10,883 Tweets (14.74 
percent of the Tweets in the data set). Most notably, women appeared among the top 
users in the data set in almost equal numbers as men. When compared to male users, 
females communicated more often and to more unique accounts. Thus, women  
 
 
                                                 
316 Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising, 104–112. 
317 Geoinferencing is a feature of Topsy data that allows Twitter user’s location to be determined by 
published location, context, geo-tagging, and topics discussed.  See Appendix for more details. 
 74 
communicated to many different people, instead of a handful of accounts. Women also 
received information from more data sources, referenced specific protest activity more in 
their messages, and were Retweeted more often.  
1. Egypt Centrality Score Comparison 
Once centrality scores were computed, the fifty users with the highest degree 
centrality scores were selected to determine gender and location. This population 
represents the users in the data set with the highest number of contacts in the data set. For 
the first fifty users selected, 24 are identified as male, 21 are identified as female, and 
four are unable to be identified. From these accounts, 14 men and 11 women were 
located in Egypt.318 The top ten male and female users were extracted for further 
analysis. For the select group of individuals, eight men and eight women listed self-
identified occupations. In the male group, there were four journalists, three online 
activists or bloggers, and one human rights advocate. The female group also included 
four self-identified journalists or writers, two bloggers, and two computer software 
developers or engineers. The majority of these Twitter users were in Cairo, one was in 
Giza, and some of the activists did not have refined location information.319 
The most significant difference between the male and female groups of users is 
found in degree centrality, specifically in-degree and out-degree centrality (see Table 
1).320 The out-degree centrality, or messages being sent from Twitter users, as well as its 
converse score calculating the number of messages being sent to a Twitter user, is very 
different. The average out-degree centrality for the female group (1212.9 unscaled) was 
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twice as much as the same score for the male group (549.4 unscaled).321 The scores 
indicate that, on average, women communicated by sending messages out to nearly twice 
as many different users than men did. Conversely, the in-degree centrality for the female 
group (294.1, unscaled) was a fraction of the male group (1047.2, unscaled). This 
indicates that while women sent information out to more unique nodes, men received 
information from more unique nodes. Essentially, women were constant communicators 
and transmitted information.  The messages women sent potentially influenced more of 
the network than those of men. 
A comparison of hub and authority centrality measures, which incorporate degree 
centrality scores, also reflects this data.322 Hubs are nodes that send information to a wide 
range of others who receive information, whereas authorities are nodes that receive 
information from many links and can serve as good sources of information.323 In the data 
set, the women had a hub centrality measure of 0.072 and an authority centrality measure 
of 0.038, whereas men had a hub average of 0.021 and an authority average of 0.128. 
This calculation factors in-and-out-degree centrality scores, thus the women in the data 
functioned as hubs more often and linked out to many other individuals, while men 
received information from more individuals. 
Furthermore, the groups of male and female users have similar scores in 
betweenness centrality, indicating little difference in their placement in the social 
space.324 This means that men and women have generally similar placement in the 
network to serve as information conduits among users. A difference in betweenness 
centrality would indicate one group is less central to information flow, and thus less 
influential, in the network. This, along with the equal participation of women in the 
                                                 
321 The unscaled value represents the total number of links, without comparison to another network of 
similar size, see Appendix for more details. 
322 See Appendix for more details 
323 “Ora User’s Guide,” ed. School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon University, Institute for 
Software Research(Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon Unversity, 2013). 
324 Betweenness centrality indicates how often a node lies on the shortest path between other nodes in 
a network, indicating the potential for information to pass through a node enroute to another node. See 
Appendix for more details. 
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Twitter data set, may indicate that there is less of a gender gap in the virtual world of 
Egyptian protestors than would be expected.325 This indicates that the gender divide may 
not be as sharp in the virtual world as it can be in the actual world of the Middle East, and 
if it is, this divide may vary by society. 
























Men 887.3 270.6 620.7 0.128 0.021 0.00257 
Women 889.6 730.4 173.3 0.038 0.072 0.00321 
 
2. Egypt User Activity Comparison 
Examining user activity offers some illumination. On average, the female users 
followed 8795 other user accounts, whereas the male users followed 2251 accounts. This 
indicates that women may be gaining information from a wider array of sources and 
sending it out to their networks. Thus the differential impact of women during the Arab 
Spring in Egypt may be their access to a wider range of information combined with a 
high amount of activity to relay that information to key nodes in the network. 
Not only did women communicate to more users and follow more users, women 
also sent more messages. Women in the data set sent almost twice as many messages in 
total, as well as twice as many messages marked with protest-related Hashtags. 
Furthermore, 51.60 percent of women’s Tweets during the timeframe were marked with 
protest Hashtags, and thus identifiable to anyone seeking information on the protests, 
whereas only 38.02 percent of men used the protest related Hashtags.326 
                                                 
325 “Arab Social Media Report: The Role of Social Media in Arab Women’s Empowerment.” 
326 This does not presume that other hashtags were not more or less relevant to the protests, simply 
that women selected hashtags meeting the search criteria more often within the data set than men did. 
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Each group boasts a similar growth in followers, or the audience they can directly 
influence. The male group experienced an average follower increase of 97.09 percent, 
while the female group saw a similar increase of 103.3 percent. While the increase in 
followers was slightly higher for women, the number of messages that were Retweeted at 
least once was higher for women (51.89 percent) compared to men (33.17 percent).327  
This does not necessarily indicate the effectiveness of these messages, but does indicate 
that female messages were relayed to other users more often than male messages.  

































Men 3826.89 97.09% 182.79 8362 3538 38.02% 33.87% 
Women 1996.32 103.31% 859.00 14721 7345 51.69% 52.77% 
 
In summary, the most prolific women in the Egyptian Twitter protest networks 
were relatively equal to their male counterparts in terms of degree centrality. The most 
significant difference between the male and female group was in the distribution of 
information and the access to information. The data set of women had higher out-degree 
and hub centrality measures, indicating that they were communicating to a wider 
audience more than their male counterparts. The male data set had higher in-degree and 
authority centrality measures, indicating they were recipients of information more often 
than the women in the data set. Furthermore, the women in the data set followed more 
Twitter users than the men did, thus accessing a potentially wider and more diverse range 
of information. Despite the gender divide in cyberspace, the group of female Twitter 
users appeared to have similar total degree and betweenness centrality scores and growth 
in followers, as well as a higher number of messages Retweeted. While the women in the 
data set may not be more influential, they experienced similar levels of growth in their 
                                                 
327 Retweets are an indicator of influence within Twitter networks. A message is first communicated 
from a user to their followers, once a message is Retweeted by one or more users, it extends to each 
network of followers that those users communicate with. 
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followers as their male counterparts. Taken as a whole, the data set of women had access 
to a larger quantity of sources of information and transmitted that information to more 
individuals, whereas the male users followed fewer sources of information and received 
more information than they sent.   
C. YEMEN 
The data set from Yemen provided little insight into any existing Twitter 
networks during the protests. While the Egyptian Arab Spring protests ousted Morsi in 18 
days, it took the Yemeni people nearly nine months of protests to remove Saleh. The 
slower escalation and progress of the Yemeni revolution may slightly explain the lack of 
a surge in Twitter feeds.  More significantly, the low Internet penetration rate in Yemen 
and the challenges of historical data collection provide less data to work with. Yemenis 
did not have wide access to cellular phones or Internet services, and thus used bloggers 
outside the country and video dumps as a way to communicate protest news to the people 
of Yemen.328 Furthermore, the protests in Yemen continued for nearly a year before 
President Saleh left. The data for Yemen included 115 nodes, and 111 links, of which, the 
majority of messages were produced by one account, owned by Khalid Azani, a civil 
engineer in Sana’a. Additional requests for data covering additional timeframes would be 
necessary to determine if men and women in Yemen employed Twitter in support of the 
protests. While women in Yemen led much of the social organization, their leadership 
leveraged longstanding strong social ties built through civil society instead of social ties 
leveraged through new media. The lack of data on the importance of social media to 
Yemen serves as a strong reminder that social media does not create protests, but is one 
tool among many that protesters use.  
D. BAHRAIN 
The data set for Bahrain includes Tweets issued from February 7, 2011 to 
February 21, 2013, marked with any of the protest Hashtags, and geoinferenced to 
locations within Bahrain. This data includes10,557 Tweets sent between 2,364 unique 
                                                 
328 Radsch, “Unveiling the Revolutionaries,” 18. 
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user accounts with 4,740 links between the nodes. The data set for Bahrain included 
fewer female user accounts within the top fifty Twitter users than the data set for 
Egypt.329 Within the fifty users with the highest degree centrality, 32 are male, 12 are 
female, and six are organizations or unidentifiable. Of the 32 male accounts, 25 are 
Bahraini and seven are foreign, while within the 12 female accounts, only five are 
Bahraini and seven are foreign. In addition to a comparatively smaller presence in the 
Twitter network, women also produced fewer messages, and contacted fewer unique 
users. 
1. Bahrain Centrality Score Comparison 
The differences in average centrality scores for male and female accounts 
demonstrate that male Twitter users in Bahrain were more active in sending and receiving 
protest-related messages than women. The male user accounts had an average total 
degree centrality score of 415, whereas the predominant female Twitter users had an 
average total degree centrality score of 166.  In terms of out-degree centrality, or the 
number of connections users had linking out to other users, male Twitter accounts had 
higher out-degree and in-degree centrality scores than female users did. The hub and 
authority centrality scores reflect a similar trend. Male accounts had higher authority 
centrality as well as hub centrality. Not only did men send and receive more messages 
than women, men were also sought after as authorities or sources of influence more often. 
The betweenness centrality measures in this data set show a significant discrepancy (0.27 
for men, 0.03 for women), indicating men have a much closer proximity in the social 
space to other Twitter users than women. In terms of average centrality measures, male 
Twitter users in Bahrain engaged in more Twitter conversation about the protests to more 
unique users than women, possibly influencing the protests more than women. 
 
 
                                                 
329 As determined by total degree centrality scores. 
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Men 415.2 216.2 81.6 0.125 0.00424 0.27226 
Women 165.6 94.2 71.8 0.0945 0.00444 0.02916 
 
2. Bahrain User Activity Comparison 
Women in the data had wider audiences and experienced a significant growth in 
followers during the time period. Male Twitter users averaged 212 users following their 
messages, whereas female Twitter users averaged 539 followers. Females also 
experienced a sharper increase in followers: one female activist, Maryam al-Khawaja, 
gained more than 3500 followers in the two-week period.330 Despite the growth in 
followership, slightly fewer female Tweets (48.80 percent) were Retweeted than male 
Tweets (54.06%). Retweets are an indicator of how far messages can influence people, 
thus this further indicates that women were, on average, less influential than men. It is 
possible that some of the growth in women’s followers resulted from renewed 
international interest in female activists following the women’s participation in the 
Egyptian protests and subsequent news reports. 
Much like the female Twitter users in Egypt, women accessed information from a 
significantly larger number of sources. Bahraini women averaged 609 accounts followed, 
whereas men followed an average of 89 accounts. That said, the women in Bahrain did 




                                                 
330  Male Average growth in Followers: 391%, Female average growth in followers: 5406% 
 81 









































152.46 695.75 202 41.14% 48.80% 
 
In terms of network centrality and Twitter usage, women in Bahrain were less 
connected and sent fewer messages than male users. While women had more followers, 
and experienced a significant growth in followers, as well as followed more sources of 
information than men, they did not spread that information as often, or to as many users, 
as the men did. Within the network of Twitter users discussing the Arab Spring protests 
in Bahrain, women contributed less information and communicated directly to fewer 
users than men in the network. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The two data sets examined paint different pictures of women’s participation in 
online activism through Twitter. The relative equal representation of women and men 
among the most well-connected Twitter users further indicate that women played a 
substantial role in the Egyptian Arab Spring. These women were bloggers, journalists, 
and social media practitioners who potentially had a better understanding of how to 
connect and employ social media. They also communicated more frequently to more 
users. While women in Egypt did not receive as many messages as their male 
counterparts, they sent out more messages than male users did. In doing so, they exerted 
influence on the online discourse about the protests. Furthermore, women sought 
information from significantly more sources than their male counterparts. Access to 
multiple sources of information, whether protest-related or collateral information, may 
contribute to the diversity and innovation of the protests. The frequent communication to 
others can serve to continuously maintain and shape the protest narrative. Additionally, 
these messages keep people informed, both domestically and internationally. Finally, on 
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the most basic level, the interaction of women online in protest discourse in almost equal 
numbers to men, adds to the volume of protesters and protest chatter and may encourage 
the participation and support of others, thus lowering barriers to protest. 
Conversely, Bahrain had fewer women participating in online protest activity 
during the Arab Spring. Compared to male Twitter users, the women in Bahrain 
connected to fewer users by sending or receiving messages. While women experienced a 
growth in their audience of Twitter followers, as well as followed more users than their 
male counterparts, they communicated less. Less communication may indicate that 
Bahraini women had fewer venues to express their ideas, relay diverse information, or 
influence protest narratives than their male counterparts. Additionally, the level of regime 
repression and the regime’s history of targeting online activists possibly served as a 
deterrent to online activists. 
Twitter networks broadcast significant quantities of information in near-real time. 
Therefore, the number of connections between users, the ability to broadcast information 
to a wide audience, and the participation in online protest activity can enable efficient 
communication and contribute to the momentum of a protest. Where female Twitter users 
appear in these online protest movements and how far they can reach with their messages 
contributes to the quantity and quality of online interaction among protestors and their 
supporters and may contribute to protest success. 
In summary, women in the top fifty Twitter users were relatively equal with their 
male counterparts in terms of degree centrality. Despite the gender divide in cyberspace, 
the group of female Twitter users appeared to have similar degree centrality scores, 
growth in followers, and number of Retweets. While the women in the data set may not 
be more influential, they experienced similar levels of growth in their followers as their 
male counterparts. The most significant difference between the male and female group 
was in the distribution of information and the access to information. The data set of 
women had higher out-degree and hub centrality measures, indicating that they were 
communicating to a wider audience than their male counterparts.  The male data set had 
higher in-degree and authority centrality measures, indicating they were recipients of 
information more often than the women in the data set. Furthermore, the women in the 
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data set followed more Twitter users than the men did, thus accessing a potentially wider 
and more diverse range of information. Taken as a whole, the data set of women had 
access to a larger quantity of sources of information and transmitted that information to 
more individuals, whereas the male users followed fewer sources of information and 









THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 85 
V. CONCLUSION 
Women’s mobilization in 2011 during the Arab Spring undoubtedly influenced 
the organization, conduct, and outcome of protests in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain, yet 
research has only begun to query the parameters of such influence. In Egypt, women 
reportedly comprised nearly 25 percent of the protestors in Tahrir Square and represented 
almost half of the most connected Twitter users in the data set analyzed.331 In Yemen, 
women organized many of the protests, relying on strong social ties generated through 
years of community-level activism, and were not represented in the data set.332 In 
Bahrain, the most heavily repressed protest in this research, women participated in protest 
activity, yet were less active in protest-related Twitter activities than their male 
counterparts.333 In comparing Twitter activity in Egypt and Bahrain, women appear far 
more central to the protests in Egypt, and it is possible that their engagement contributed 
to elements of protest success more so than women in Bahrain. In Yemen, while not 
represented in the Twitter data, women were heavily engaged in organizing protests and 
that engagement also allowed them to contribute to factors influencing protests success.  
A. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The Twitter data analyzed suggests that women in Egypt were almost equally 
represented in protest-related Twitter messaging during the two weeks surrounding the 
January 25 protests. The most prominent female Twitter users in the data set had similar 
results to male users in terms of the number of users they were connected to. Women, 
however, sent communications outwardly to significantly more users than men and 
women received information from significantly more sources than men. In Bahrain, the 
most prominent female Twitter users were far less connected to other users than their 
male counterparts and communicated less frequently. 
                                                 
331 Khamis and Vaughn, “Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution,”17; see Chapter IV. 
332 Yadav, “Tawakkul Karman as Cause and Effect;” Clark, Islam, Charity, and Activism,137–139. 
333 Radsch, “Unveiling the Revolutionaries,” 12, 21–22. 
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A comparison of the greater volume of communication women in Egypt as 
compared to men, as well as the smaller volume of communication women in Bahrain 
compared to men, may have enabled women in Egypt to influence the protests more than 
women in Bahrain. In influencing protests, these women may have had a greater effect on 
factors related to protest success.  In terms of nonviolence, if women do have a 
preference for nonviolence, they may have expressed this to a broader audience.  
The Twitter data indicates that the most significant contribution women provided 
by participating in the Arab Spring protests was diversity. Women in both countries 
followed a significantly higher number of Twitter accounts, thus gaining access to more 
numerous and potentially diverse sources of information. In Egypt, women also 
communicated to more unique users than men, thus providing their own thoughts and 
ideas to a wider audience as well as relaying the Tweets of others. In Bahrain, women 
communicated with fewer unique users and were more peripheral in communications 
networks. While women had access to more sources of information than men, they 
relayed their own thoughts or Retweeted others’ ideas less frequently than men.  In 
Yemen, while not on Twitter, women organized protests and were able to engage 
networks throughout civil society to facilitate diversity and innovation within the social 
movement. The connection of women to more diverse sources of information in all three 
countries, via virtual or physical networks, facilitates their contributions to diversity and 
innovation within a protest movement.  
Studies of networks show that a small group of members often produce the 
majority of the work, and that the diversity and size of this group determine the 
effectiveness of a network.334 Studies also indicate that increased participation inspires 
more participation in an interactive network, thus increasing the potential for collective  
 
 
                                                 
334 Oliver, et al, “A Theory of the Critical Mass. I.,” 524; Oliver and Marwell, “A Theory of the 
Critical Mass. II,” 1. 
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action.335 Thus participation of women in addition to men in the Twitter data may have 
contributed to increased diversity and effectiveness of the Twitter networks, as well as 
encouraged participation in collective action. 
Another factor in protest success, cohesive group identities, can be reinforced 
through the use of symbols, frames, and narratives. In the case of Twitter networks, 
Hashtags can serve as symbols and mobilizing frames, and the content of the Tweets 
fosters a narrative among online activists.  In the Egypt data, women employed protest-
related Hashtags in more than half of their Tweets, whereas men employed the same 
Hashtags much less. Nearly 52 percent of women’s Tweets employed at least one protest-
related Hashtag, whereas only 38 percent of male Tweets employed a protest-related 
hashtag.336 Thus, women reinforced a very specific protest frame (#Jan25) more often 
among the online activists than their male counterparts. Not only did this behavior 
contribute to group identity, it increased the volume of Tweets about the protests more 
than if the network only had male participants. Additionally, women in Egypt had their 
messages Retweeted to other users in higher percentages than men, which indicates that 
the narratives women choose to express or relay, reached a wider audience than their 
male counterparts. In Egypt, female Twitter users reinforced the mobilization frames and 
shaped the protest narratives, doubling the quantities of protest-related messages. 
In Bahrain, women communicated less, and appeared to be equal to men in their 
use of protest-related Hashtags; however, they communicated less and were also less 
Retweeted than male Twitter users. While female participation added to the volume of 
messages reinforcing protests narratives and frames, there was not a substantial 
difference between male and female contributions to group identity. If anything, women 
reached a smaller audience than men through their Tweets and their contributions to 
group identity were comparatively smaller. 
                                                 
335 Markus, “Toward a ‘Critical Mass,” 499. 
336 While this does not exclude the possibility of other protest-centric Hashtags, for example “#egypt,” 
female Tweeters used the protest date Hashtags more often, invoking a specific protest frame in their 
messaging. 
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Another significant area of contribution was communication. Women in Egypt 
communicated more often to more users and a higher percentage of their messages were 
focused on protest-related activity. These frequent communications helped information 
about protests reach a wider, more diverse audience than male-only communications. 
Also, men within the Egypt data set received more communications than women did. 
This could mean that while women received information from more sources and 
broadcast their ideas and information to more people, they also had a better chance of 
reaching male Twitter users with higher authority or influence, to include individuals 
planning and coordinating the protest activity. 
In Bahrain, women communicated less frequently and to fewer individuals than 
men did. While women added to the volume of protest-related communication, their 
communications did not reach as far as their male counterparts.  Female contributions to 
protest-related communications were lower in Bahrain than in Egypt during the Arab 
Spring. 
Frequent communication about protests to a wide audience can engender support 
and encourage participation in protest activity, thus lowering barriers to protest. A sense 
of strength in numbers, communications about the level of violence, or requests for 
supplies and support can shape protest participation. In terms of sheer volume and 
diversity of communication, the women using Twitter to communicate protest-related 
matters, when combined with their male counterparts, added to the protest-related 
messaging. These messages informed people about upcoming events, safety information, 
and potentially added to the perceived size of the protest. The frequency and reach of this 
information may have helped lower the barriers to protest.  In Egypt, women contributed 
to that frequency and reach. In Bahrain, women contributed less to the volume of 
communication in Twitter networks, and thus relayed less information about the protests 
to include safety or event information.  
Ultimately, whether the protests succeeded or not, women were successful in 
contributing to the numbers and volume of protest related traffic online.  In the real 
world, women were planners, coordinators, and reporters. Their constant communication  
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and connection to multiple sources and recipients of information, in addition to their male 
counterparts, influenced the relative success of the Arab Spring protests in Egypt, 
Yemen, and Bahrain.  
B. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The data set explored represents a fraction of protest activity during the Arab 
Spring. Additional data sets for the same timeframe using different search parameters 
including location and Hashtag information could be used to amplify these findings. 
Analyzing Retweets and the spread of specific messages or links could provide additional 
indicators of influence among the users in the data set. 
Furthermore, this data set represents only one social networking program 
employed by protestors. Twitter is used to broadcast information an updates, however, 
websites like Facebook were used for longer-term planning among activists.337 An 
analysis of other programs, Facebook in particular, would shed considerable light on the 
online protest social network and its influencers. 
Finally, an analysis of these networks since the Arab Spring, given the rise in 
social network account holders in the Middle East and the rising popularity of these 
programs, could also provide clues as to whether women have gained, maintained, or lost 
influence in online social networks since early 2011. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This thesis concludes that women did participate in the Arab Spring protests in 
both on an offline. In Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain, women physically mobilized to 
participate in protests. Women in Yemen, however, did not mirror their actual 
mobilization with virtual mobilization due to a lack of access and training throughout the 
country. Instead, Yemeni women relied on traditional social mobilization tactics and 
organized protests through extensive social networks built through civil society. As 
organizers, women were involved in selecting nonviolent protest repertoires, employing 
                                                 
337 “Arab Social Media Report: Civil Movements: The Impact of Facebook and Twitter,”  in Arab 
Social Media Report (Dubai: Dubai School of Government, 2012), 4–5. 
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diversity and innovation in their protests, creating cohesive identities, frames, and 
symbols, and finding ways to lower barriers to protest.  
In Egypt and Bahrain, women mobilized physically as well as virtually by using 
social media tools such as Facebook, Blogs, and Twitter micro-blogs. Twitter data from 
the Arab Spring protests illustrates differences between male and female online protest 
activity that may have shaped elements of the protests. In general, women directed 
communications out to other users more than men, while men received more 
communications from other users. Additionally, women followed significantly more 
Twitter users, indicating that they receive information from more diverse information 
sources. 
In Egypt, where women were present in Tahrir Square, they accounted for almost 
half of the most connected Egyptian Twitter users in the data set. Additionally, women 
broadcast information to nearly twice as many users as men did. In contrast, men 
received nearly three times more information from users than women. Egyptian women 
also followed more than four times as many accounts than men did, thus having access to 
more diverse sources of information. In the Egypt data set, women not only received 
more information, but distributed that information more often. Thus women’s 
participation online potentially contributed to the numbers of users and messaging, the 
diversity of message content, and the amount of information communicated. 
 Women in Bahrain also physically mobilized and faced regime repression, 
intimidation, and arrests alongside their male counterparts. Virtually, however, they were 
significantly less prevalent in the Twitter data set, accounting for only 17 percent of the 
most connected Bahraini Twitter users; by comparison, men in Bahrain comprised fifty 
percent of the most connected users. While female Twitter users in Bahrain still broadcast 
information out to others slightly more often than they received information, the male 
Twitter users broadcast and received the majority of messages. Women in Bahrain 
followed nearly six times more users than their male counterparts; however, they relayed 
that information as well as their own thoughts much less than Egyptian women. Bahraini 
women also appeared as less central players in Bahrain’s Twitter protest  
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communications. While women in Bahrain employed Twitter and social media to 
participate in the protests, they were less prevalent in the Twitter data set than then men 
in Bahrain. 
While each country’s Arab Spring has a different narrative of success, failure, and 
regime repression, women in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain played a role in each story. 
Taking to the streets and to the web, women contributed to the protests by mobilizing 
their own social networks, promoting nonviolent repertoires, adding diverse opinions and 
skills, and communicating to a wide audience through social media. As Egypt, Yemen, 
and Bahrain adjust to the aftermath of the Arab Spring, many female activists may find 
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APPENDIX. METHODOLOGY 
The data set analyzed consisted of full individual Tweet retrieval from protest-
centric Tweets originating from the countries of interest from the end of January to the 
end of February 2011. A two-week time period for country was identified, representing 
Twitter activity prior to, during, and after the protests. Once the data was structured, each 
data set was imported into Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA) and Gephi, software 
programs used for visualizing social networks and computing measurements of influence 
for individuals and groups within social networks. Each program employs different 
methods of calculating similar scores and provides different features, thus using two 
programs helps validate the data and answer specific questions.  
The Twitter networks are considered directed, as each Tweet is a one-way 
communication. These networks are also asymmetric because not every individual 
communicating with another Twitter user receives a communication in return (an 
example of this would be spamming or group messages). The networks are also 
considered scale-free as a small portion of the users create the largest portion of the 
messaging, and many users only connect to a small number of users while a few users 
connect to a large group associates.338 Essentially a few people reach out to many, while 
many people reach out to few.  Thus, the predominant Twitter users were identified in 
each data set by high degree centrality, or many links to other accounts. Each user’s 
profile was queried through the Twitter search function.339 As there is no definitive way 
to verify gender online, gender was determined by any one, or combination of, gender 
specific name, gender specific photo, user description of gender, or an embedded URL 
that linked to a blog or Facebook page with identifiable gender. Profiles with no 
identified gender were noted, but not further analyzed. Translations of Arabic words 
found on the profiles were done using Google Chrome’s translate function.  
                                                 
338 Hands, @ Is For Activism, 119. 
339 Twitter Search Webpage, retrieved on May 15, 2013, from http://search.twitter.com. 
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Following the identification of genders, the top male and female Twitter accounts 
originating in the country of interest were extracted to compare their potential influence 
in the Twitter network. Network influence was assessed through centrality scores created 
by weighting links and connections throughout the network.340 Twitter networks may not 
reflect a network of strong social ties, thus centrality scores are only a partial indicator of 
influence. To provide additional indicators of potential influence, other factors such as 
number of contacts, Tweets, Retweets, and growth of friends and followers were 
analyzed. These patterns and centrality scores were compared to determine the 
differential impact of women within this Arab Spring Twitter data set. 
A. DATA SET 
The data set was acquired from Topsy Labs, Inc, and contained a comma-
separated values file of 131,512 individual Tweets selected based upon date, protest-
Hashtag, and location data. The data is a large sample of Tweets collected and identified 
as originating in Egypt, Yemen, or Bahrain from January 23, 2011 until February 22, 
2011 using at least one of the identified protest-related Hashtags.341 Each of these data 
sets was broken down into a two-week period surrounding the protest event (Table 1) 
The Twitter data was delivered in a comma-separated values file format 
(59.6Mb), consisting of fields related to user profile information, location data, full Tweet 
message text, time of message creation, and other fields identified by Topsy Labs (Table 
3). 
B. DATA STRUCTURING 
The data was first structured in order to remove empty fields, transform dates and 
times into formats that analysis programs could process, and remove potential errors.  
This data structuring and refinement was conducted with Google Refine and Microsoft 
                                                 
340 For the purpose of social network analysis, these Twitter networks are considered asymmetric and 
directed, wherein each individual may not talk to the same number of individuals and each Tweet 
represents a one-way communication that may or may not generate a response. 
341 Lynch, The Arab Uprisings, 104–112. 
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Excel. Unnecessary fields that did not contain data essential to analysis were removed 
from the file. The text of the Tweets was sorted to extract usernames and Hashtags into 
separate columns for importing into analysis programs. The usernames mentioned were 
reformatted to ensure consistency in the name formats. After exporting the file, the data 
was opened with Microsoft Excel to further review and refine the data. The 
“user.created_at” and “created_at” fields were reformatted from text to date fields in 
order to import the data into analysis programs. The Twitter data for Egypt, Yemen, and 
Bahrain was exported into separate files for analysis. After completing data structuring, 
the files were each imported into ORA for mapping and processing and then into Gephi.  
Each transformed data set was imported into the program ORA, or Organizational 
Risk Analyzer. ORA takes structured social network data and uses measurements to 
produce reports that compare scores among actors to determine how knowledge, 
influence, and tasks are spread among actors in a network.342 This software identifies 
actors whose knowledge or role in a network influences network behavior and allows the 
network to be manipulated and visualized.343 The data was imported and mapped with 
each Tweet connecting a user to the user they mention in the Tweet by either replying to 
a Tweet or sending a Tweet mentioning another Twitter user.344 Once the data was 
imported into ORA, standard social network analysis measurements were computed, and 
those scores were compared between actors to assess potential levels of influence each 
Twitter user exercised within the Twitter social space. Each file was then exported in a 
“.net” file format for use with the Gephi Program.  
Once imported into Gephi, the network was again mapped in order to assess 
scores and visualize the network. Gephi is an open-source visualization platform that 
allows the user to conduct analysis and assess metrics on networks. Gephi enables the 
“easy creation of social data connectors to map community organizations and small- 
 
                                                 
342 Everton, Dark Networks, 69–70. 
343 Ibid., 69 
344 Both a Tweet “In reply to” and a Tweet with an “@mention” user mention will appear in the 
Twitter user’s profile that the message is directed to. 
 96 
world networks.”345 Once the data was displayed in ORA and Gephi, the centrality 
scores and key influencer statistics for the full network and each network by country were 
calculated.  
C. ANALYSIS 
A combination of centrality scores and user statistics were used to evaluate the 
activity and influence of key nodes. Users were first identified using total degree 
centrality as a measure of the total user each user was connected through Twitter 
interactions. After ordering by degree centrality scores, the users as well their scores were 
extracted into a separate file for comparative analysis.346 
The fifty nodes with the highest degree centrality scores were identified to 
confirm gender and location through use of the Twitter online search function.347 If a 
profile had a gender-specific picture, name, statement indicating gender, or a link to 
Facebook page or blog, the gender of the user was recorded accordingly. The Twitter data 
set was also explored to find additional names and blog URLs to gain further insight and 
verify the Twitter search results. The location confirmation was conducted via the same 
method. In cases where the profile was protected, media sources, or gender and location 
could not be determined were ignored. The resulting data set consisted of ten male and 
ten female Twitter users located in the country of interest at the time of the protests.  The 
centrality scores and the Twitter data of these users was then extracted to compare 
centrality scores and user information. 
                                                 
345 Gephi website, retrieved August 3, 2013, from https://gephi.org. 
346 Total degree centrality is the same calculation in ORA and Gephi because the score represents the 
number of links to and from a node. 
347 Twitter Website, retrieved August 15, 2013, from http://www.twitter.com. The quantity of nodes 
was selected to ensure that enough Twitter profiles were scanned to create a sample set of male and female 
Twitter accounts. 
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1. Centrality Scores348 
Centrality scores measure the significance of a node given its location in the 
social space by computing links associated with the node in relation to other nodes in the 
network and their links, or in this case the Twitter user account in relation to other 
accounts in the network and their links. All scores were computed through the ORA 
software program’s analysis capabilities that calculate various centrality scores and 
produce reports.  
Total Degree Centrality in this network indicates the number of 
connections a Twitter user of interest in the network has directly to other Twitter 
users.349 This includes users who received a message from another user, individuals who 
a user sent a message to, and individuals mentioned in a Tweet as the Tweet shows up in 
their Twitter account as a “mention.” The count of a user’s ties in a Twitter network may 
indicate a user’s potential as a source of information as well as their ability to influence 
communications vis-à-vis their Twitter network and the Twitter networks of those they 
Tweet to.350 This calculation was used to determine potentially significant Twitter users 
in the network and isolate them for additional analysis. 
In-degree Centrality indicates the number of directed links pointing to the 
user of interest.351 In this data set, this represents the number of accounts who sent 
Tweets to the account of interest. The in-degree scores may indicate a potential source of 
information or authority.352 An example of this function would be when many users pass 
information to these users of interest and the information subsequently gets Retweeted to 
a broader audience. These scores were used to identify potential sources of information 
within the Twitter networks. 
                                                 
348 Everton, Dark Networks., 397–403; Carley, Kathleen M & Pfeffer, Jürgen & Reminga, Jeffrey & 
Storrick, Jon & Columbus, Dave. ORA Help Manual Glossary(2013); ORA User’s Guide. Carnegie Mellon 
University, School of Computer Science, Institute for Software Research, Technical Report, CMU-ISR-13-
108, 
349 Everton, Dark Networks, 208–209; “ORA User’s Guide,” 18. 
350 “Ora User’s Guide,” 1178–1180. 
351 Everton, Dark Networks, 401. 
352 “Ora User’s Guide,” 8. 
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Out-degree Centrality indicates the number of outbound links from the 
user of interest. 353  These links may include original Tweets as well as Retweets. 
Depending on the networks receiving the Tweets, an individual with high out-degree 
centrality may communicate with a wider population than an individual with lower out-
degree centrality.354  Individuals with high out-degree centrality may be influencers 
themselves or want to be influencers within a network; their actual level of influence is 
determined by how far their message spreads via their followers and their followers 
Retweets of the message.355  This score was used to determine which users passed 
information out to more nodes in the network. 
Authority Centrality identifies users who are potentially connected to more 
good sources of information, or Hubs. By contrast, Hub Centrality identifies which users 
are more connected to individuals who can disseminate that information.356  
Betweenness Centrality, which describes the proximity of users on the 
shortest path between other users in the social space were evaluated as well. These 
centrality scores were used to compare the networks of the most connected male and 
female Twitter users to determine their potential influence and access to information.357 
2. User Activity Measures 
Activity for each user was assessed via fields collected from historical Twitter 
data. Each individual Tweet can contain information about the user and their location, 
number of followers, accounts they are following, dates and times of transmission, the 
language used in the Tweet, Retweets, and the method an individual used to submit the 
Tweet. These values can indicate how many Twitter users follow an account and can  
 
 
                                                 
353 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 401. 
354 “Ora User’s Guide,” 14. 
355 Ibid, 1178–1180. 
356 Everton, Dark Networks, 242, 400. 
357 Ibid., 210, 397. 
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view Tweets from that individual, how many accounts a user follows and can view 
information from, how a user posts their Tweets, and the general location they may post 
Tweets from.   
The first quantity assessed was the number of Tweets users sent during the two-
week timeframe based on the search criteria and protest Hashtags. The total number of 
Tweets sent by each user, is identified in the difference between the highest and lowest 
user status number. The difference between the collected Tweets and Tweets sent 
indicates how many Tweets were marked with the search criteria, and how many Tweets 
were not.  This difference provides a general point of comparison, but does not illuminate 
whether other Hashtags that were protest related were used (i.e., #Tahrir, #PearlSquare). 
Then the number of followers, and the percentage in growth of followers during 
the time period was assessed for each of the users of interest. In the case of this data set, 
an increase in followers may indicate an increase in the potential audience a user can 
reach with their Tweet and serves as a measure of direct influence.358 Additionally, the 
number of accounts a user is following was also assessed. This indicates the range of 
potential information sources that a user can access. The numbers of and change in 
followership and accounts being followed for each user provides an indication of the 
quantity, and potential diversity of, information sources a user has access to.  Finally, the 
number of Retweets and percentage of collected Tweets Retweeted was reviewed to 
determine how widely retransmitted messages were, which can also indicate how 
influential a Twitter user is.  In reviewing the metadata accompanying the Twitter 
messages, amplifying information about each user’s activity and influence can be used to 
compare users. 
The centrality scores and activity measures were totaled and averaged for each 
group of male and female users to compare differences in centrality, influence, and  
 
 
                                                 
358 “ORA User’s Guide,” 1178–1180. 
 100 
activity.  These comparisons, while not a complete picture of user activity, can provide 
some indications of differences in influence and activity between male and female 
Twitter accounts. 
D. CHALLENGES 
The data set represents a one-time query of the historical Twitter archives. Due to 
the nature of the query, the protest dates, locations, and Hashtags were combined to gain 
the largest sample of protest-related Tweets from the region while filtering out Tweets 
that did not originate from the region. It is likely that further queries of the archives and 
data set would produce more Tweets meeting these criteria and could refine the data for 
each country, date range, or Hashtag. Challenges with historical data retrieval and 
geoinferencing, changes in computer networks and systems, and local network measures 
to control or conceal online activity conducted by activists and regimes may also affect 
the completeness of this specific data set. Future queries, research, and additional data 
retrieval could help build a more robust sample size.   
Access to the software programs necessary to transform and analyze the data was 
also limited. ORA has a Twitter analysis function; however, it is limited to new versions 
of the software and requires specific data formats. Palantir, a tool designed for big data 
mining and visualization is also developing and deploying its own Twitter analysis 
capability. These software packages will be useful for anyone conducting future research. 
Additionally, gender identification and language translation also proved difficult.  
This could be improved via translation services and conducting interviews with 
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Yemen Jan 26, 
2011–Feb, 
10, 2011 
148 111 115 
Bahrain Feb 7, 
2011–Feb, 
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131,512 15,756 59,271 
* Note that Tweets frequently contain more than one Hashtag, many Tweets 
incorporated more than one of the listed Hashtags, along with Hashtags not listed here, 
when referencing the Arab Spring. An example would be Tweets about the Arab Spring 
Hashtagged “#Jan25, #Egypt, #25Jan” or “#Jan24, #Feb14, #Protest.” 
Table 6.   Mapping Fields: Agent x Agent Network 
 
 User Screen Name User Mention 1–11 
 ORA Agent Agent 












Table 7.   Topsy Fields Used for Analysis359 
Field Description Comment 
User.screen_name User’s screen name. Self-Identified 
User.name User’s name Self-Identified 
User.created_at When the user 
account was created 
System Generated 
User.followers_count 
Number of followers 
for the user 
System Generated 
user.friends_count Number of Twitter 
accounts the user is 
following 
System Generated 
User.created_at When the account was 
created. 
System Generated 
created_at Date and Time of 
Tweet Creation. 
System Generated 
in_reply_to_screen_name For Tweets that are 
Replies, this is the 
account the Tweet is 
replying to. 
Generated by user activity. 
in_reply_to_status_id_str String of Tweet being 
replied to. 
Generated by user activity. 
Retweet_count Number of Retweets 





Method used to post 
the Tweet 




User.statuses_count The number of Tweets 
for the user 
Generated by user activity. 
User.lang The language selected 
by the user 
User Generated 
User.location Self–described user 
location 
User Generated 





                                                 
359 Fields provided by Topsy Labs, Inc in the Full Tweet Retrieval JSON Field Guide. 
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